Interview on Ernst Jünger – Julien Hervier – PHILITT – March 15th 2018

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On the occasion of the 20th anniversary of Ernst Jünger’s death, PHILITT spoke with Julien Hervier, his translator, friend, and biographer who reflected on the life of one of the great German writers of 20th century.

PHILITT: Ernst Jünger is known today for his war writings which would establish him as a major author, from his first book Storms of Steel, published in 1920. The war was destruction but also revelation for him. What did it reveal to him?

Julien Hervier: The truth of the Man. At the start of the Great War, Ernst Jünger was a young man from a bourgeois family, adventurous and psychologically unstable. He was immersed in the Christian morality proper to the society of his time, although his family was rather distant from religion and his father was a fervent rationalist. In the course of the conflict, he discovered what Freud had perfectly analyzed in the same era, but far from the fighting: the unleashing of instinct that breaks all moral barriers erected by civilization. It revealed itself to him without God – he then call himself totally atheist – man was disoriented in the moral scheme. There is, on this subject, a beautiful passage from his novel Lieutenant Sturm: the hero seduces a young prostitute and confesses his instinct to kill and his violent impulses during the assault. It’s as if he was seeking a form of forgiveness in which absolution is given, not by a priest, but by a benign person. We can compare this reaction with an episode from Ernest Hemingway’s famous novel For Whom the Bell Tolls, in it an old Republican peasant dramatically describes the loss of his belief in God; he finds its leaves him helpless before the necessities of war, as if he sees himself forced to kill, to whom could he confess his error and how would he be absolved of his sins?

PHILITT: What was Jünger’s place in this intellectual abundance of the interwar German Conservative Revolution?

Julien Hervier: Following the war, there was a whole nebula of extremist movements, on the right as well as on the left, which spent their time dividing themselves. Ernst Jünger collaborated with a certain number of small magazines on the nationalist right. He then appeared as one of the most remarkable personalities of this movement, because of his glorious war experience, symbolized by his exceptional decoration “Pour le mérite.” This decoration was actually given to numerous superior officers, but very rarely to simple infantry lieutenants. He possessed an exceptional combatant’s prestige which would then serve to protect him from Hitler. Moreover, intellectually, he was considered the most brilliant writer in this nebula. From the point of view of style or thought, he is incontestably the most prestigious. In the philosophical scheme, his brother Friedrich Georg had received a much deeper philosophical education than his; furthermore Heidegger considered him a better philosopher than Ernst. But very rapidly, from his arrival on the front, he was seriously wounded and thus didn’t have the occasion to distinguish himself and attain the same military prestige as his brother. Younger and not having experienced the war, though having combat experience in the Freikorps, Ernst von Salomon was also a representative writer of this German right, but he doesn’t situate himself on the same literary level.

PHILITT: Jean-Pierre Faye, in the line of Albert Béguin, didn’t hesitate to write “Thus three friends, Schmitt, Jünger, Heidegger – the strange trio of thinkers – contributed to the language of this Reich that devastated Europe in the Second World War.” What response do you have to these excessive, to say the least, statements?

Julien Hervier: You know Talleyrand’s quote: “All that is excessive is insignificant.” What Faye wrote is purely ideological and of little interest. Here we’re denying a complex reality. What is true on the other hand, it’s that there were degrees of compromise more or less elevated. The altitude at which Carl Schmitt’s thought moves is undeniable, but he was also a careerist eager for honors and success. And at the level of simple moral decency, the moral decency of Orwell or Camus, he behaved in an inadmissible manner when he justified the massacres of the “Night of the Long Knives” by raison d’État. His initial engagement on the side of Hitler was indeed scandalous, even if he then became more critical and ended up being viewed negatively by the regime. Heidegger was in turn a philosopher who didn’t understand what Nazism really was. Against a flood of scientist and purely materialist enthusiasm for technical progress, especially among the Anglo-Saxons and Russians, he thought that this new German party could allow the philosophy of being to resist decline. It’s quite clear that he could only have been disappointed; furthermore he recognized this major error, this “big mistake.” Ernst Jünger, unlike the other two, never joined the Nazi party; and his allegorical novel On The Marble Cliffs was considered at the time, as much by Hitler’s partisans as by his enemies, as a novel of opposition to the Führer, as a work of resistance. The judgment of his contemporaries has more weight than ours.

PHILITT: The Soldier, the Worker, the Rebel, the Anarch, all of these are at the heart of Jünger’s work. What do they tells us about his era?

Julien Hervier: The Worker (Arbeiter in German) is a figure linked to the evolution of technical thought, itself arising from the philosophical thought of the West. It is part of a historical logic of the development of Western civilization, and the man of technology is currently present everywhere. Nevertheless, we must be specific: translated into French, Arbeiter can also have a very particular meaning: that of “worker,” especially since the industrial revolution as analyzed by Karl Marx. But the Jüngerian Arbeiter is a vaster figure, he can also be a general as much as a businessman. Jünger defines him as someone whose values come from technology and its prodigious development over the past past three centuries. He’s a figure of reference, ontological in nature, linked to the essence of civilization. The figures of the Rebel or the Anarch are moral figures. In order to define them, Jünger often used the image of the Leviathan, to which they are contrasted. Leviathan, such as the state conceived by Hobbes in the 17th century, or the present technological state, a state whose omnipotence we see reinforcing itself, thanks to modern means of control over the individual. We are in a world where Big Brother’s control is pervasive and resistance is needed. The “Rebel”, it’s a French translation, but the original German word, der Waldgänger, evokes someone who seeks refuge in the forests. It’s for that reason that in French the book is entitled “Treatise on the Rebel or the Recourse to the Forests.” Jünger refers to the old Icelandic practices in which rebellious people banished from society found refuge in the forests. But Jünger always insisted that, in the modern world, the Rebel doesn’t necessarily hide in nature but he can hide in the most populous cities, camouflaged in the eyes of the state. With the Anarch, he wanted to go further in his analysis of resistance. It must totally shift in relation to the scale of value they seek to impose on us. If we only want to invert it, we are lost, as Montherlant pleasantly wrote: “There is nothing that resembles a torpedo boat more than a destroyer.” Starting from the moment where you accept the problem as posed by your adversary, you are lost. You only reverse his values. The Anarch refuses this game. He doesn’t create a party, and this sense, he distinguishes himself from the anarchist. He is alone while the anarchists are part of a collective movement.

PHILITT: Reading his Parisian Journals, one is instantly struck by a certain passivity, a comfortable atonia during the Second World War. The man of action then disappeared, replaced by the contemplative spirit that he would remain until the end of his life?

Julien Hervier: Jünger couldn’t show what he thought. In a totalitarian regime, if you say that you’re against it, you are immediately shot or sent to a concentration camp. So showing his opposition in an explicit manner would be suicidal and useless. So he only followed the assassination attempt planned by Stauffenberg from afar. He could have still been executed as an accomplice if they reported him; it was punishable by death, even if he was not actively engaged in the operation. One of the motifs of his mission in the Caucasus, at the end of 1942, was to gauge the reactions of officers on the Eastern front, in case of an attempt against Hitler. Furthermore, high treason against the state was incompatible with his vision of the soldier. In his journal he mentions the Roman general Coriolanus, the subject of Shakespeare’s play, who revolted against his country and dreads his fate.

PHILITT: Regarding his work, Jünger mentions “an old and a new testament.” Do you share this vision of two Jüngers?

Julien Hervier: It’s true that an enormous difference exists between the young 20 year old thirsting for action who found the bourgeois world stifling, and the man who matured and became a sort of old sage, absorbed by his research on insects whose progressive disappearance he deplored in an ecological spirit. His evolution is incontestable.

PHILITT: You just wrote a book on Drieu la Rochelle. Une histoire de désamours (Gallimard); what intellectual and personal links did the two men entertain in Paris during the Occupation?

Julien Hervier: They only met rarely, but Drieu la Rochelle had an admiration for the author of Storms of Steel. It was a reciprocal esteem. Rapidly wounded on the field of battle many times, the French writer spent relatively little time on the front; on the contrary, Ernst Jünger fought for the entire duration of the entire war, despite numerous wounds. Their service records had nothing to do with each other, even if Drieu was also very courageous and experienced the exaltation of war. For him, modern war has two aspects: the exhalation of the charge, when he took part in the assault on Charleroi; and panicked terror in the face of the superpower of technology, which expresses itself in his cry of absolute terror at Verdun, under the bombardments that they had to passively endure. This battle embodied all the horror of modern industrial war. What brings these two writers closer together is both the exaltation of physical courage and the vision of war as the revealer of human truth. Neither of them were followers of Rousseau, neither of them believed in fundamental human goodness. However, they diverged on their analyses regarding technology. As from a certain side, we can consider The Worker as an apology for technology: Jünger considers it as something that imposes itself with the same obvious character as the laws of nature. The evolution of Western society cannot escape it. We observe it even more today: for example, how to organize de-growth today, without putting millions of people into unemployment? We are caught in the gears, the world has entered into total dependence on technology. The two authors were great readers of Nietzsche but on this precise point, at the time where he wrote The Worker, Jünger was more Nietzschean than Drieu, as for him, we must day yes to the state of the world as it is. It’s useless to oppose it.

PHILITT: Novalis, the poet, the figure of Romanticism from Jena, exercised a considerable influence on Jünger. Was he the last of the German Romantics?

Julien Hervier: There is indeed an entire aspect that underlines Ernst Jünger’s romanticism, particularly concerning the dimension of the dream. He presents very beautiful narratives of them in his journal. His most beautiful novel, in my opinion, On the Marble Cliffs is also a reinterpreted dream. A dream that he had during a voyage to Rhodes by boat which is not far from the visions of the Apocalypse in the Christian tradition. This dimension of the dream, of the relation to nature, to the unconscious, this refusal of a mechanized vision of the world: all this links him with the German Romantics but also the French symbolists. He is much closer to Rimbaud and Baudelaire, who he admired, than the French Romantics.

PHILITT: We are very familiar with Jünger the warrior, but much less so with Jünger the dabbler in drugs. What was he seeking in what he called “psychonautics?”

Julien Hervier: Precisely, he sought to break the purely rational and materialist comprehension of the world. He was a man of risk who wanted to touch the boundaries. He wanted to see what was on the other side. As much on the field of battle, in violent action, as in the framework of psychological experimentation, but always under the control of instruments of reason. Thus he had did first LSD experiments with his friend Albert Hoffman, the inventor of this drug, and practiced these experiences under strict medical control.

PHILITT: A writer who converted to Catholicism at the end of his life but whose writings nevertheless reveal a profound pagan mystique, what was the place of religion in his life?

Julien Hervier: Having spoken with his wife about it, I can affirm that his conversion to Catholicism at the end of his life was purely social. The Catholic readers of Jünger often want to imagine this moment as a true conversion. But Jünger’s entire body of work tends to show that there is a religious dimension and a form of spirituality among all peoples. He was not far from believing that it was of little import if one worships the Christian Trinity, Jehovah, or Allah … Thus there are texts by him where he says he’s willing to adopt the religion of the place where he finds himself: if he had lived in a Muslim country, he would be a Muslim. In his elderly years, he was perfectly integrated in the Swabian and Catholic world of Wilflingen, whose parish priest he was close to. He believed that in contemporary Western civilization, where death was skirted around, Christian religion remained capable of honoring human beings when they passed. In this sense, his interment was one of solemnity and grandiose simplicity. That’s Chateaubriand genius of Christianity. That’s the reasons for his conversion.

PHILITT: How would you analyze the difference in the perceptions of his work between France and Germany?

Julien Hervier: He’s read a lot more in Germany than in France, even if, among us, there is a little circle of people inspired by Jünger. But in comparison with Germany, his readers are relatively less there. In the “Society of Friends of Ernst and Friedrich Georg Jünger”, there are very few French people. Only three or four of us are coming to the Heiligkreuztal colloquium this year where I’ve sometimes found myself to be the only French person. For a long time, in France, we appreciated literary quality above the political opinions of writers. People hardly questioned their political color then. In Germany, after the fall of Nazism, the question was much more sensitive; unfortunately in France as well, now we’re tending to enter in this logic. Just look at the problems currently posed by Céline and Maurras, though nevertheless commemorations do not mean that we admire people, only that we recognize the importance of the historical role they played. In this domain, the contemporary French mentality tends to blandly join the German mentality.

Source: https://philitt.fr/2018/03/15/julien-hervier-pour-ernst-junger-le-monde-est-entre-dans-la-dependance-totale-de-la-technique/

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Monika Berchvok Speaks With Robert Steuckers – Euro-Synergies – May 8th, 2018

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Following the publication of Pages celtiques by éditions du Lore and the trilogy Europa by éditions Bios of Lille, Monika Berchvok subjected the author of these works, Robert Steuckers, to a rapid fire volley of questions, showing that even the rebels of the young generation of the 2010s want to know the oldest roots of this silent revolt which is growing across all of Europe. Monika Berchvok previously interviewed Robert Steuckers during the publication of La Révolution conservatrice allemande by éditions du Lore in 2014.

Your career is extremely intellectually wealthy. What is the origin of your engagement?

To speak of intellectual wealth is certainly exaggerated: I am above all a man of my generation, to whom they still taught the “basics”, which today, alas, have disappeared from academic curricula. I experienced my childhood and adolescence in a world that was still marked by quiet tradition, the mores and manners were not those of the industrial world or the service sector, where we increasingly separate from concrete and tangible reality, increasingly acquiring an unbounded pretension and arrogance against “provincials,” like me, who remain anchored in the muck of reality with their heavy boots (yes, yes, that’s from Heidegger…). My father, who really hadn’t been to school, except to the primary school in his Limburg village, wanted nothing to do with the fashions and crazes that agitated our contemporaries in the 1960s and 70s; “all fafouls,” he claimed, “fafoul” being a Brussels dialect term used to designate idiots and cranks. I lived in a home without television, far from and hostile to the mediocre little universe of the pop tune, variety show, and hippy or yéyé subculture. I still thank my progenitor, 25 years after his death, for having been able to totally resist the miserable abjection of all those years where decline advanced in giant steps. Without television, it goes without saying, I had a lot of time to read. Thanks Papa.

Next, I was a gifted student in primary school but fundamentally lazy and desperately curious, the only life saver, to avoid ending up a tramp or a prole, was learning languages to a competent level because, in Brussels, I lived on a street where they spoke the three national languages (and the dialectical variants), with the Russian of a few former White officers and their children who wound up in our fair city in addition. With this linguistic plurality, the task was already half done. Clément Gstadler, a neighbor, an old Alsatian teacher who had ended up in Belgium, told me, donning his ever present traditional hat of the Thann countryside and with a razor sharp Teutonic accent: “My boy, we are as many times men as languages we know.” Strengthened by this tirade hammered into me by Gstadler, I thus enrolled, at the age of eighteen, in Germanic philology and then in the school of translators – interpreters.

The origin of my engagement is the will to remain faithful to all these brave men that we consider anachronistic today. On their certitudes, under siege, we must erect a defensive structure, which we hope will become offensive one day, resting on principles diametrically opposed to the hysterics of the trendy people, to construct in our hearts an alternative, impregnable fortress, that we are determined never to give up.

How do you define your metapolitical combat?

Dilthey, with whom the alternative minded of our type unfortunately aren’t familiar enough, partially constructed his philosophical system around one strong simple idea: “We only define what is dead, the things and facts whose time has definitively ended.” This fight is not over because I haven’t yet passed from life to death, doubtlessly in order to thwart those who my stubbornness displeases. It is evident, as a child of the 1950s and 60s, that my first years of life unfolded in an era where we wanted to throw everything away. It’s of course a gesture that I found stupid and unacceptable.

Retrospectively, I can say that I felt, in my young mind, that religion left the scene as soon as it renounced Latin and the spirit of the crusader, very present in Belgium, even among peaceful, calm, authors, like a certain Marcel Lobet, totally forgotten today, doubtlessly because of the excessive moderation of his words, nevertheless ultimately invigorating for those who knew how to capture their deep meaning. The philosopher Marcel Decorte, in his time, noted that society was disintegrating and that it was collapsing into “dissociety,” a term that we find again today, even in certain left wing circles, to designate the present state of our countries, weakened by successive waves of “civilizational negationism,” such as the ideology of Mai 68, New Philosophy, neo-liberal pandemonium, or gender ideology, all “dissociative” phenomena, or vectors of “dissociation,” which today converge in the Macronist imposture, mixing together all these baneful delusions, seven decades after opening Pandora’s Box. Thus the metapolitical combat must be a combat that unceasingly exposes the perverse nature of these civilizational negationisms, continuously denouncing above all the outfits, generally based beyond the Atlantic, that fabricate them in order to weaken European societies to create a new humanity, totally formatted according to “dissociative” criteria, negators of reality as it is (and cannot be otherwise, as the relevant philosopher Clément Rosset remarked, who unfortunately passed away in recent weeks). To make a metaphor with the ancient world, I would say that a metapolitical combat, in our sense, consists of, as the European history expert of Radio Courtoisie Thomas Ferrier said, putting all these negationisms in Pandora’s Box, from which they sprang, then closing it.

You mention “bio-conservatism” in your recent works? What does this term cover?

I didn’t mention “bio-conservatism.” My editor, Laurent Hocq of Editions Bios, believes that it’s a path we will need to explore, precisely in order to fight “civilizational negationisms,” notably all the elements that deny the corporeality of man, his innate phylogenetics, and his ontology. For me a well conceived bio-conservatism must go back to the implicit sociology that Louis de Bonald sketched in the 19th century, critiquing the individualist drift of the Enlightenment philosophers and the French Revolution. Romanticism, in its non-ethereal or tearful aspects, insists on the organicity, vitalist and biological, of human and social phenomena. We must couple these two philosophical veins – traditional conservative realism and organic Romanticism – and then connect them to the more recent and more scientifically established achievements of biocybernetics and systems theory, while avoiding falling into perverse social engineering as desired by the Tavistock Institute, whose cardinal role in the elaboration of all forms of brain washing that we’ve endured for more than sixty years was investigated by the “conspiracy theorist” Daniel Estulin, now living in Spain. The “Tavistockians” used biocybernetics and systems theory to impose a “depoliticized” culture across the Western world. Today these disciplines can be perfectly mobilized to “re-politicize” culture. Laurent Hocq wants to initiate this work of metapolitical mobilization with me. We will have to mobilize people competent in these domains to complete the task.

At the end of the road, rethinking “bio-conservatism” is nothing more or less than the will to restore a “holistic” society in the best sense of the term as quickly as possible, that is to say a society that defends itself and immunizes itself against the fatal hypertrophies leading us to ruin, to degradation: economic hypertrophy, juridical hypertrophy (the power of manipulative and sophist jurists), the hypertrophy of the services sector, hypertrophy of petty moralism detached from reality, etc.

Localism is also a theme that often reoccurs in your recent books. For you the return to the local has an identitarian dimension, as well as a social and ecological one?

Localism or the “vernacular” dimensions of human societies that function harmoniously, according to timeless rhythms, are more necessary than ever at a time where a sagacious geographer such as Christophe Guilluy notes the decline of “France from below”, the marvelous little provincial towns that are dying before our eyes because they no longer offer a sufficient number of local jobs and because their light industry has been relocated and dispersed to the four corners of the planet.

Attention to localism is an urgent necessity in our time, in order to respond to a terrifying evil of neo-liberalism that has expanded since Thatcher’s accession to power in Great Britain and all the fatal policies that the imitators of this “Iron Lady” have seen fit to import into Europe and elsewhere in the world.

The refusal of the migratory “great replacement” happens through an understanding of immigration movements in the era of total globalization. How can the tendency of migratory flows be reversed?

By not accepting them, quite simply. We are a stubborn phalanx and it is imperative that our stubbornness become contagious, taking on the appearance of a global pandemic.

Nevertheless, when you mention the fact that there must be an “understanding of migratory movements,” you indirectly underline the necessity of deeply understanding the contexts from which these migrants come. For half a century, and even longer since Mai 68 had antecedents in the two decades that preceded it, we have been fattened on junk culture, of inane varieties, which occupies our minds with time consuming spectacles and prevents them from concentrating on things as real as they are essential. A good state is a state that inquires about the forces at work in the world. Whether migratory flows are accepted or not, every host state, guided by a healthy vision of things, should draw up an economic, ethnic, and social cartography of the populations coming from the emigrants’ countries.

For Africa, that means understanding the economic state of each migrant exporting country, the possible system of kleptocracy that reigns there, the ethnic components (and the conflicts and alliances that result from them), the history of each of these political or anthropological phenomena, etc. This knowledge must then be delivered by an honest press to the citizens of our countries, so that they can make judgments about credible pieces and not be forced to vote according to unremitting propaganda based on inconsistent slogans.

For Syria we should have known, before the waves of refugees spilled into Europe, the religious and tribal structures of the country in a very precise manner: actually, the media, generally uncultivated and dependent on the “junk culture” imposed on us for decades, discovered the Syrian divisions that had been ignored until now. Only a handful among us has a clear notion of who the Alawites or Yezidis are, knows that the Syrian Christian communities have complicated divisions, understands the tacit alliance that unites Alawites with Twelver Shiites, understands that the principal enemy of the Ba’athist political system is the Muslim Brotherhood, which fomented the terrible disorders of 1981-1982 that ravaged Syria in the time of Hafez al-Assad, father of the current president. In short, the general public knows nothing about the complexity of Syria. The only bone it has to gnaw is the slogan that decrees Assad is a horrible monster, fit to be eliminated by fundamentalist assassins or American bombs.

For Africa, the only means of reducing the waves of refugees, real or solely economic, would be to put an end to evidently very kleptocratic regimes, in order to fix the populations on their native soil by redirecting sums of money toward infrastructural investment. In certain more precise cases, that would also happen through a return to a subsistence agricultural economy and a partial and well regulated abandonment of monoculture which doesn’t properly nourish populations, especially those that have opted for rural exodus towards the cities and sprawling slums, like Nigeria for example.

For Syria, we should have established a filter to sort refugees but that would have, ipso facto, privileged Muslim or Christian communities allied to the regime, to the detriment of the hostile social classes, who are totally un-integrable into our European societies, because the Salafism that animates them is viscerally hostile to all forms of syncretism and all cultures that do not correspond to it 100%. Moreover, as a general rule, the reception of migratory flows coming from countries where there are dangerous mafias is not recommended even if these countries are European like Sicily, Kosovo, Albania, or certain Caucasian countries. All immigration should pass through a well established anthropological screening process and not be left to chance, at the mercy of the “invisible hand” like the one that all the liberals expect the world to be perfected by. Non-discernment in the face of migratory flows has transformed this constant of human history into a catastrophe with unpredictable repercussions in its current manifestations, as evidently these flows do not bring us a better society but create a deleterious climate of inter-ethnic conflict, unbridled criminality, and latent civil war.

Reversing the tendency of migratory flows will happen when we finally implement a program of triage for migrations, aiming for the return of criminals and mafiosos, the psychologically unbalanced (that they deliberately send here, the infrastructure capable of accommodating them being non-existent in their countries of origin), politicized elements that seek to import political conflicts foreign to us. Such a policy will be all the more difficult to translate into daily reality where the imported mass of migrants is too large. Then we cannot manage it in proper conditions.

You knew Jean Thiriart. Does his political vision of a “Great Europe” still seem relevant?

Jean Thiriart was firstly a neighbor for me, a man who lived in my neighborhood. I can note that behind the sturdy and gruff sexagenarian hid a tender heart but bruised to see humanity fall into ridicule, triviality, and cowardice. I didn’t know the activist Thiriart because I was only twelve when he abandoned his political combat at the end of the 1960s. This combat, which extended over a short decade starting from Belgium’s abandonment of the Congo and the tragic epilogue of the war in Algeria for the French, two years later. Thiriart was motivated by a well developed general idea: abolish the Yalta duopoly, which made Europe hemiplegic and powerless, and send back the Americans and Soviets in succession in order to allow the Europeans to develop independently. He belonged to a generation that had entered politics, very young, at the end of the 1930s (the emergence of Rexism, the Popular Front, the war in Spain, the Stalinist purges, Anschluss, the end of the Czechoslovakia born at Versailles), experienced the Second World War, the defeat of the Axis, the birth of the state of Israel, the coup in Prague, and the blockade in Berlin in 1948, the Korean War, and the end of Stalinism.

Two events certainly contributed to steer them towards an independentist European nationalism, different in sentiment from the European nationalism professed by the ideologues of the Axis: the Hungarian Revolt of 1956 and the Suez campaign, the same year, the year of my birth in January. The West, subjugated by Washington, did nothing to aid the unfortunate Hungarians. Worse, during the Suez affair, the Americans and the Soviets forced the French and British to unconditionally withdraw from the Egyptian theater of operations. Thiriart, and a good number of his companions, temporary or not, observed that the duopoly had no desire to dissolve itself or even to fight each other, to modify one way or the other the line of the Iron Curtain that cut Europe across its center, to tolerate any geopolitical affirmation on the part of European powers (even if they were members of the UN Security Council like France and the United Kingdom). The decolonization of the Congo also demonstrated that the United States was unwilling to support the Belgian presence in central Africa, despite the fact that Congolese uranium underpinned the nuclear supremacy of Washington since the atom bombs fabricated in order to bring Japan to its knees in 1945. A little history, Hergé’s brother was the only Belgian military officer not to chicken out and he showed an arrogant hostility to the NATO troops who came to take control of his Congolese base.

One thing leading to another, Thiriart would create the famous movement “Jeune Europe” that would inject many innovations into the discourse of the activist milieu and contest the established order of what one could classify as the extreme-right in its conventional forms, petty nationalists or Poujadists. The “habitus” of the extreme-right did not please Thiriart at all, who judged them unproductive and pathological. A reader of the great classics of the realist politics, especially Machiavelli and Pareto, he wanted to create a small hyper-politicized phalanx, rationally proceeding from truly political criteria and not thin emotions, creating only behavioral indiscipline. This political hyper-realism implied thinking in terms of geopolitics, having a knowledge of the general geography of the planet. This wish was realized in Italy alone, where the magazine Eurasia of his disciple and admirer Claudio Mutti has done remarkably well and has attained a very elevated degree of scientific precision.

To bypass the impediment of Yalta, Thiriart believed that we needed seek allies across the Mediterranean and in the East of the vast Soviet territorial mass: thus the attempt to dialogue with the Nasserist Arab nationalists and the Chinese of Chou Enlai. The Arab attempt rested on a precise Mediterranean vision, not understood by the Belgian militants and very well comprehended, on the contrary, by his Italian disciples: according to Thiriart this internal sea must be freed from all foreign tutelage. He reproached the various forms of nationalism in Belgium for not understanding the Mediterranean stakes, these forms turned more towards Germany or the Netherlands, England or the Scandinavian countries, an obligatory “Nordic” tropism. His reasoning about the Mediterranean resembled that of Victor Barthélémy, an adviser of Doriot and also a former communist, a reasoning shared by Mussolini as mentioned in his memoirs. Thiriart very probably derived his vision of Mediterranean geopolitics from a feeling of bitterness following the eviction of England and France from the Mediterranean space after the Suez affair in 1956 and the war in Algeria.

According to Thiriart, the Europeans shared a common Mediterranean destiny with the Arabs that could not be obliterated by the Americans and their Zionist pawns. Even if the French, the English, and the Italians had been chased from the Arabophone North African shore, the new independent Arab states could not renounce this Mediterranean destiny they shared with non-Muslim Europeans, massed on the Northern shore. For Thiriart, the waters of the Great Blue sea unite, not separate. From this fact, we must favor a policy of convergence between the two civilizational spaces, for the defense of the Mediterranean against the element foreign to this space, interfering there, constituted by the American fleet commanded from Naples.

The idea of allying with the Chinese against the Soviet Union aimed to force the Soviet Union to let go of its ballast in Europe in order to confront the Chinese masses on the Amur River front. The dual project of wagering on the Nasserist Arabs and the Chinese marked the last years of Thiriart’s political activity. The 1970s were, for him, years of silence or rather years where he immersed himself in the defense of his professional niche, namely optometry. When he returned to the fight at the start of the 1980s, he was nearly forgotten by the youngest and eclipsed by other political and metapolitical lines of thought; moreover the given facts had considerably changed: the Americans had allied with the Chinese in 1972 and, since then, the latter no longer constituted an ally. Like others, in their own corners and independently of each other, such as Guido Giannettini and Jean Parvulesco, he elaborated a Euro-Soviet or Euro-Russian project that the Yeltsin regime didn’t allow to come to fruition. In 1992 he visited Moscow, met Alexander Dugin and the “red-browns,” but unexpectedly died in November of the same year.

What we must retain from Thiriart is the idea of a cadre school formed on principles derived from pure political philosophy and geopolitics. We must also retain the idea of Europe as a singular geostrategic and military space. It’s the lesson of the Second World War: Westphalia defended itself on the beaches of Normandy, Bavaria on the Côte d’Azur and along the Rhône, Berlin at Kursk. Engines allowed for the considerable narrowing of the strategic space just as they allowed for the Blitzkrieg of 1940: with horse-drawn carts, no army could take Paris from Lorraine or Brabant. The failures of Philip II after the battle of Saint-Quentin prove it, Götz von Berlichingen never went past Saint-Dizier, the Prussians and Austrians never went past Valmy, and the armies of the Kaiser were stopped on the Marne. One exception: the entrance of the allies into Paris after the defeat of Napoleon at Leipzig. The United States is henceforth the sole superpower, even if the development of new arms and imperial hypertrophy, that it imposed on itself through unthinking immoderation, slowly break down this colossal military power, recently defied by the new capabilities of Russian or perhaps Chinese missiles. European independence happens through a sort of vast front of refusal, through the participation of synergies outside of what Washington desires, as Armin Mohler also wanted. This refusal will slowly but surely erode the supremacist policy of the Americans and finally make the world “multipolar.” As Thiriart, but also Armin Mohler, doubtlessly wanted, and, following them, Alexander Dugin, Leonid Savin, and yours truly want, multipolarity is the objective to aim for.

Three German author seem to have left their mark on you particularly: Ernst Jünger, Carl Schmitt and Günter Maschke. What do you retain from their thought?

Actually, you ask me to write a book… I admire the political writings of the young Jünger, composed in the middle of the turmoil of the 1920s just as I also admire his travel narratives, his seemingly banal observations which have made some Jüngerians, exegetes of his work, say that he was an “Augenmensch,” literally a “man of the eyes,” a man who surveys the world of nature and forms (cultural, architectural) through his gaze, through a penetrating gaze that reaches far beyond the surface of apparent things and perceives the rules and the rhythms of their internal nature.

Very soon I will release a voluminous but certainly not exhaustive work on Carl Schmitt. Here I want to remind people that Carl Schmitt wrote his first relevant texts at the age of sixteen and laid down his last fundamental text onto paper at 91. So we have a massive body of work that extends over three quarters of a century. Carl Schmitt is the theorist of many things but we essentially retain from him the idea of decision and the idea of the “great space.” My work, published by éditions du Lore, will show the Schmitt’s relation to Spain, the very particular nature of his Roman Catholicism in the context of debates that animated German Catholicism, his stance in favor of Land against Sea, etc.

Speaking about Günter Maschke interests me more in the framework of the present interview. I met Günter Maschke at the Frankfurt Book Fair in 1984, then during a small colloquium organized in Cologne by high schoolers and students under the banner of the Gesamtdeutscher Studentenverband, an association that intended to oversee the student organizations which, at the time, were working towards the reunification of the country. Maschke was a thundering and petulant former leader of the activist years of 1967 and 1968 in Vienna, from which he would be expelled for street violence. In order to escape prison in West Germany, because he was a deserter, he successfully defected, via the French collective, “Socialisme ou Barbarie,” first to Paris, then Cuba. He then settled in the insular Castroist Carribean republic and met Castro there, who gave him a tour of the island in order to show him “his” sugar cane fields and all “his” agricultural property. Maschke, who can’t hold his tongue, retorted to him, “But you are the greatest latifundist in Latin America!” Vexed, the supreme leader didn’t renew his right of asylum and Maschke found himself back at the beginning, that is to say in a West German prison for thirteen months, the span of the military service he refused, as demanded by the law. In prison, he discovered Carl Schmitt and his Spanish disciple Donoso Cortès, and in the cramped space of his cell, he found his road to Damascus.

Many activists from 67-68 in Germany henceforth turned their backs on the ideologies they professed or utilized (without really believing in them too much) in their youth years: Rudi Dutschke was basically a anti-American Lutheran nationalist; his brothers gave interviews to the Berlin new conservative magazine Junge Freiheit and not usual leftist press, which repeats the slogans of yesterday without realizing that it has fallen into anachronism and ridicule; Frank Böckelmann, who was presented to me by Maschke during a Book Fair, came from German Situationism and never hesitated to castigate his former comrades whose anti-patriotism, he said, was the mark of a “craving for limits,” of a will to limit themselves and mutilate themselves politically, to practice ethno-masochism. Klaus Rainer Röhl, a nonagenarian today, was the spouse of Ulrike Meinhof, who sunk into terrorism with Baader. Röhl too became closer to the nationalists while the articles of Ulrike Meinhof in her magazine konkret would trigger the first fights in Berline during the arrival of the Shah of Iran.

Uli Edel’s film devoted to the “Baader Meinhof Gang” (2008) also shows the gradual slide of the terrorist “complex” in West Germany, which arose from an idealistic and unreasoning, uninhibited, and hysteric anti-imperialism, but often correct in some of its analyses, to pass into an even more radical terrorism but ultimately in the service of American imperialism: in his film, Edel shows the stakes very clearly, notably when Baader, already arrested and sentenced, speaks with the chief of police services and explains to him that the second generation of terrorists no longer obeys the same guidelines, especially not his. The second generation of terrorists, while Meinhof, Baader and Ensslin (Maschke’s sister in law!) were imprisoned and had not yet committed suicide, assassinated statesmen or economic decision makers who correctly wanted to pursue policies in contradiction with the desires of the United States and free West Germany from the cumbersome tutelage that Washington imposed on it. This shift also explains the attitude taken by Horst Mahler, Baader’s lawyer and partisan in armed struggle in his time. He would also pass to nationalism when he was released from prison, a nationalism strongly tinted with Lutheranism, and he would return to prison for “revisionism.” The last I heard, he was still languishing there.

At the start of the 1980s, Maschke was an editor in Cologne and notably published the works of Carl Schmitt (Land and Sea), Mircea Eliade, Pierre Drieu la Rochelle, Agnès Heller, and Régis Debray. Every year, in October when the famous Frankfurt Book Fair took place, Maschke, who thought I had the countenance of an imperturbable young reactionary, had Sigi, his unforgettable spouse who left us much too soon, set up a cot in the middle of his prestigious office, where the most beautiful flowers of his library were found. So every year, from 1985 to 2003, I frequented the “Maschke Salon,” where personalities as prestigious as the Catholic and conservative writer Martin Mosebach or the Greek political philosopher Panajotis Kondylis, the ex-Situationist Franck Böckelmann,or the Swiss polemicist Jean-Jacques Langendorf dropped by. These soirees were, I must admit, pretty boozy; we sang and performed poems (Maschke likes those by Gottfried Benn), the fun was de rigeur and the ears of a good number of fools and pretentious people must have rung as they were lampooned. I inherited a frank manner of talking from Maschke, who often reproached me, and he helped consolidate my mocking Bruxellois verve, which I owe to my uncle Joseph, my mother’s very sarcastic brother.

I can’t finish this segment without recalling the fortuitous meeting between Maschke and Joschka Fischer, the year where the latter had become a minister in the Land of Hesse, the first step that would lead him to become the German minister of foreign affairs who made his country participate in the war against Serbia. Fischer strolled down the long hallways of the Book Fair. Maschke came up to him and patted his stomach, very plump, saying to everyone: “Well, comrade Fischer, fattening up to become minister.” Next followed a torrent of acerbic words poured out on the little Fischer who looked at his sneakers (his trademark at the time, in order to look “cool”) and stammered apologies that he wasn’t. Scolding him as if he was only a dirty brat, Maschke proved to him that his Schmittian neo-nationalism was in accord with the anti-imperialist tendencies of the 1967-68 years, while Fischer’s alignment was a shameful treason. The future would give him ample justification: Fischer, former violent Krawallo (hooligan) of Hessian leftism, became a vile servant of capitalist and American imperialism: the dithyrambic phrases that he pronounced these last weeks praising Chancellor Merkel only accentuate this bitter feeling of betrayal. These remarks are evidently valid for Daniel Cohn-Bendit, today a war monger on sale to Washington. Jean-François Kahn, in an interview very recently accorded to Revue des deux mondes, spoke of him as a former sixty-eighter turned neocon in the style of the East Side Trotskyites.

In his quest after his return from Cuba and his stay in a dreary Bavarian prison, Maschke, unlike Mahler or Dutschke’s family for example, evolved, with Schmitt and Donoso, towards a Baroque and joyous Catholicism, strongly tinted with Hispanicism and rejected the uptight, Protestant, and neo-Anabaptist violence that so clearly marked the German extra-parliamentary revolutionaries of the sixties. For him as for the director Edel, the Ensslin sisters, for example, were excessively marked by the rigorous and hyper-moralist education inherent to their Protestant familial milieu, which seemed insupportable after his stay in Cuba and his journeys to Spain. Also because Gudrun Ensslin fell into a morbid taste for an unbridled and promiscuous sexuality, resulting from a rejection of Protestant Puritanism as Edel’s film highlights. The Maschkian critique of the anti-Christianity of the (French) New Right is summarized by a few choice words, as is his habit: thus he repeats, “they are guys who read Nietzsche and Asterix simultaneously and then fabricated a system from this mixture.” For him, the anti-Christianity of Nietzsche was a hostility to the rigors of the Protestantism of the family of Prussian pastors from which the philosopher of Sils-Maria came, a mental attitude that is impossible to transpose in France, whose tradition is Catholic, Maschke doesn’t take the Jansenist tradition into account. These anecdotes show that any political attitude must fall back into a kind of Aristotlean realism.

You return to the contribution of the Celtic world to our continental civilization in your book “Pages celtiques.” What do we retain from the “Gaulish” in our European identity? You return to the Irish and the Scottish nationalist movement at length. What lessons should we draw from their long struggles?

In “Pages celtiques”, I wanted, essentially, to underline three things: firstly, the disappearance of all Celtic cultural and linguistic references is the result of the Romanization of the Gauls; this Romanization was apparently rapid within the elites but slower in the spheres of popular culture, where they resisted for five or six centuries. The vernacular culture retained the Celtic language until the arrival of the Germans, the Franks, who took over from the Romans. We can affirm that the popular religiosity retained the religiosity of “eternal peasants” (Mircea Eliade) and it remained more or less the religion whose rituals were practiced by the Celts. This religiosity of the soil remained intact under the Christian veneer, only the religion of the elites from the start. The dei loci, the gods of places, simply became saints or Madonnas, nestled in the trunks of oaks or placed at crossroads or near springs. The “de-Celticization,” the eradication of the religion of “eternal peasants,” occurred under the blows of modernity, with the generalization of television and … with Vatican II. What the French still have from the “Gaulish”, was put to sleep: it’s a fallow field awaiting a reawakening. Our essence, in Belgium, was deeply Germanized and Romanized, in the sense where the Eburons, the Aduatuques, and the Treviri were already partially Germanized in the time of Caesar or later when the Ingvaeonic Germanic tribes settled in the valley of the Meuse served Rome and rapidly Latinized.

Secondly the Celtic contribution is equally Christian in the sense where, at the end of the Merovingian era and at the start of the Pippinic / Carolingian era, Christian missions were not only guided by Rome, they were also Irish – Scottish with Saint Columban, who settled in Luxeuil-les-Bains, the formerly Gaulish, then Roman, thermal baths site. Lorraine, Alsace, Franche-Comté, Switzerland, Wurtemberg, Bavaria, Tyrol, and a part of Northern Italy received the Christian message not from the apostles who came from the Levant or missionaries mandated by Rome but from Irish – Scottish monks and ascetics who proclaimed a Christianity closer to the natural religiosity of the indigenous peoples, with some pantheist dimensions, while advocating the large scale copying of ancient, Greek and Latin manuscripts. The Christian, Celtic, and Greco-Latin syncretism that they offered us remains the foundation of our European culture and any attempt to remove or eradicate one of these elements would be a useless, even perverse, mutilation, that would deeply unbalance the foundations of our societies. The smug and foolish moralism, proper to the recent history of the Church and its desire to “third worldize,” also ruined all the seduction that the religion could exercise on the popular masses. Failing to take the vernacular (Celtic or otherwise) into account and ceasing to defend the heritage of the classical humanities (with the political philosophy of Aristotle) at any price has separated the masses from the intellectual and political elites of the Church. The parishes have lost their flocks: actually, what did they have to gain from hearing the moralizing sermons without depth repeated ad nauseum that the Church henceforth offers to them.

Thirdly, in the 18th century, the Irish, Scottish, and Welsh Enlightenment philosophers were certainly hostile to absolutism, calling for new forms of democracy, demanding popular participation in public affairs and calling for a respect of vernacular cultures by the elite. The enlightenment republicanism of the Irish, Scottish, and Welsh hostile to the English monarchy which subjected the Celtic peoples and Scottish people (a mixture of Celts, Norwegians, and free Anglo Saxons) to a veritable process of colonization, particularly cruel, but this hostility was accompanied by a very pious devotion to the cultural productions of the common people. In Ireland, this republicanism was not hostile to the homegrown and anti-establishment Catholicism of the Irish nor to the multiple remnants of pantheist paganism that was naturally and syncretically harbored in this Irish Catholicism. The representatives of this religiosity were not treated as “fanatics,” “superstitious,” or “brigands” by the Republican elites. They would not be vilified nor dragged to the guillotine or gallows.

The Celtic Enlightenment philosophers of the British Isles did not deny rootedness. On the contrary, they exalted it. Brittany, non-republican, was the victim, like the entire West, of a ferocious repression by the “infernal columns.” It largely adhered to the ancien régime, cultivating nostalgia, also because it had, in the era of the ancien régime, a “Parliament of Brittany,” that functioned in an optimal manner. The uncle of Charles De Gaulle, “Charles De Gaulle No. 1”, would be the head of a Celtic renaissance in Brittany in the 19th century, in the framework of a monarchist ideology. In the same era, the Irish independence activists struggled to obtain “Home Rule” (administrative autonomy). Among them, at the end of the 19th century, was Padraig Pearse, who created a mystic nationalism, combining anti-English Catholicism and Celtic mythology. He would pay for his unwavering commitment with his life: he would be shot following the Easter Rising of 1916. Likewise, the union leader James Connolly mixed syndicalist Marxism and the liberatory elements of Irish mythology. He would share the tragic fate of Pearse.

The leaders of the Irish independence movement offer to political observers of all stripes an original cocktail of nationalist labor unionism, mystic Celticism, and social Catholicism, where the ideology of human rights would be mobilized against the British not in an individualist sense, featuring, for reference, a man detached from any social bond with the past, thus a man who is modeled as a “nameless apostasy from reality.” On the contrary, from the start Irish Republican ideology reasons according a vision of man that fits into into a cultural, social, and bio-ethnic whole. All that must also be the object of legal protection with a corollary that any attack, anywhere in the world, on one of these ethnic-social-cultural ensembles is an attack on a fundamental human right, the right to belong to a culture. So the rights of man, for the Irish, are inseparable from the cultures that animate and feed human societies.

After the Second World War, the Welsh would take up the cause of the Bretons pursued by the Republic, which would be condemned by the International Court of Human Rights for crimes against Breton culture: this fact is quite evidently forgotten, because it was knowingly hidden. Today, notably following the peremptory tirades of the “nouveaux philosophes,” whose path begins around 1978 and continues today, forty years later (!), with the hysterical fulminations of Bernard-Henri Lévy, the Republic sees itself as the defender par excellence of human rights: it is henceforth piquant and amusing to recall that it was condemned on a charge brought by the Welsh and Irish for crimes against a vernacular culture of the Hexagon, and consequently any politically act that ultimately infringes the rights of a people’s culture, or denies it the mere right to exist and propagate, is equally a crime liable for an equivalent sentence. So there exist other possible interpretations and applications of human rights than those that automatically treat anyone who claims an identity rooted in physical belonging as backwards or potentially fascist. Thus human rights are perfectly compatible with the right to live in a rooted, specific, and inalienable culture that ultimately has a sacred value, on soil it has literally turned for centuries. Hervé Juvin, through an original and politically relevant interpretation of the ethnological and anthropological works of Claude Lévi-Strauss and Robert Jaulin, is the one who has shown us the way to follow today in order to leave behind this deleterious atmosphere, where we are called to swear an inextinguishable hatred towards what we are deep within ourselves, to rob ourselves of what’s deep in our hearts in order to wallow in the nihilism of consumerism and political correctness.

I partially owe this Celticism,both revolutionary and identitarian, to the German activist, sociologist, and ethnologist Henning Eichberg, theorist and defender of identities everyone in the world, who expressed an analogous Celticism in a militant and programmatic work, published at the start of the 1980s, at the same time Olier Mordrel published his “Mythe de l’Hexagone.” Elsewhere, my friend Siegfried Bublies would give the title Wir Selbst to his non-conformist, national-revolutionary magazine, the German translation of the Gaelic Sinn Fein (“We Ourselves”). Bublies was the editor of Eichberg’s polemical and political texts, who passed away, alas too soon, in April 2017.

In “Pages celtiques”, I also pay homage to Olier Mordrel, the Breton combatant, and define the notion of carnal fatherland, while castigating the ideologies that want to eradicate or criminalize it.

You’ve restarted Trans-European activities. How do you the judge the evolution of “identitarian”forces in Europe?

No, I’ve restarted nothing at all. I’m too old. We must leave it to the youth, who are doing very well according to the criteria and divides inherent to their generation, according to modes of communication that I haven’t mastered as well as they have, such as social networks, videos on YouTube, Instagram, Facebook, or others. The institutions challenging the ambient mismanagement are multiplying at a good pace because we are experiencing a consolidated conservative revolution in relation to what it was, lying fallow, twenty or thirty years ago. It’s true that the dominant powers have not kept their promises: from the Thirty Glorious Years, we’ve passed to the Thirty Piteous Year, according to the Swiss writer Alexandre Junod, who I knew as a child and has grown up so much … And he is still optimistic, this boy: if he wrote a book, he would have to mention the “Thirty Shitty Years.” As we’ve fallen very very low. It’s really the Kali Yuga, as the traditionalists who like to mediate on Hindu or Vedic texts say. I modestly put myself in the service of new initiatives. The identitarian forces today are diverse but the common denominators between these initiatives are multiplying, quite happily. We must work for convergences and synergies (as I’ve always said…). My editor Laurent Hocq has limited himself to announcing three international colloquiums in order to promote our books in Lille, Paris, and Rome. That’s all. For my part, I will limit myself to advise initiatives like the “Synergies européennes” summer universities, even if they are very theoretical, as they allow me to encounter and adapt fruitful strategies for the years to come.

Source: http://euro-synergies.hautetfort.com/archive/2018/05/08/monika-berchvok-s-entretient-avec-robert-steuckers.html

 

The Family With Proudhon and In Democracy – Albert Vincent – Cahiers du Cercle Proudhon – 1912

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By asking me to speak to you of the family, you are addressing yourselves to the father of the family, to the militant syndicalist, to the rural teacher that I am. In these conditions, I willingly answered your appeal. Will you kindly remember to ignore the form of my informal chat to retain only the substance of the reflections that follow.

I

The fate of the family does not highly interest the man of the state. That divorces rise, that cohabitation is growing, that births diminish, that is not enough to trouble his serenity: “Order maintained in the street, – wrote Proudhon – force resting in the law, the man of the state can rest on his work, and they will only have to repeat the proverb: the world goes on its own.”

But how would this fate excite the serious syndicalist who feels strongly that the capitalist system cannot endure for long? The syndicalist sees that we are going through profound transformations from which he must make up his mind. It is frightening sometimes. The idea then comes to him to go back, to abandon his union and to live selfishly. Impossible! He guesses that his retreat would stop nothing and that the worker’s rush would pursue its inevitable course.

Yet, continuing to reflect, he is calmed. “We can fearlessly march in the vanguard” – he said – “if we continue to practice our traditional virtues and if, in particular, the family remains upright, respected and honored more than ever. In it we find the possibility and the guarantee of the boldest social progress.”

Such are the thoughts that naturally unfold in the mind of the thinking syndicalist.

Thus that is all for the better: the struggle for righteousness could progress without demagogy, without weakness if, at this moment, the syndicalist would recognize his two worst enemies who pose one or the other, as his devoted saviors: I have named the socialist politician and the anarchist.

Why would the syndicalist suspect the socialist politician and the anarchist? He has nothing against them. They have won his confidence by firstly pronouncing a certain number of anti-capitalist phrases that he knows exactly. Willingly, he listens with interest to the following speeches that they make to him. Thus he learns that morality is quite simply an ensemble of hypocritical prejudices against which it is good to revolt; that the family has evolved and will continue to evolve; that having children is to “play the game of the capitalists”; that the bonds of marriage are heavy chains that in order to be truly free, truly strong, we should not fear breaking, etc.

This successful teaching, notice, has nothing proletarian. Will I say he is bourgeois? No. These lines of Proudhon have more truth today than they had a half century ago: “There is no longer any bourgeoisie, there is not even anyone to make one. The bourgeoisie, essentially, was a feudal creation, neither more nor less than the clergy and the nobility. It only has a meaning and could only find one by the presence of the two first orders, the nobles and the clerics.”

Very precisely, this teaching is given by loafers, by the rotten whose woes have aroused demagogic passions. We would speak poorly by calling them to revolt: there is in revolt a holy love of Justice. These déclassés are disgruntled men who find society bad because they do not find themselves doing well and because the place they occupy is not good enough. They are the envious brothers – brothers all the same – of the upstarts of democracy (stock jobbers at the exchange, “fashionable” writers and mighty politicians) that they attack with such hateful and jealous rage.

No, these folks have nothing in common with the people! However, their propaganda still gives results. It touches above all “the youth” and it is through them that it is very dangerous.

Thus it is necessary to combat it. But how? Believe me: the struggle is extremely difficult to lead, as the workers, unconsciously but completely subservient to democratic dogmas, quickly treat you as suspect and invoke the authority of anarchist and socialist intellectuals.

It’s then that we are happy to encounter Proudhon, to make an appeal to his powerful arms and contrast to his noble thought, the base rantings of “advanced” democrats. Impossible, actually, to treat Proudhon as a bourgeois “playing the game of the capitalists.” On the other hand, we can contemplate facing it: that would be the encounter between the Pygmy and the Titan.

Proudhon hinders our democrats. They best keep silent as well: it’s their way of showing that they think freely.

A significant fact among all: in his speech in Besançon, Mr. Viviani did not say a word of the ideas of Proudhon on love, marriage, and the family; ideas that yet hold a great place in Proudhonian thought. Was it modesty? Was it fear? I am inclined towards fear: not a line of Proudhon who, in these matters, would have branded with a red hot iron the big bosses of democracy united at the foot of the statue of this great French moralist.

But this conduct dictates ours. The truth embarrasses the democrats, we will say. They bury Proudhon, we will exhume him. This makes us serve both the cause of the intellectual and that of the common people which I am, for my part, with every fiber in my body.

II

Because he already observed, in his times, that French society is threatened with dissolution, Proudhon wrote On Justice in the Revolution and In the Church. The goal of the work, he said, was “to recognize the reality of evil, by assigning it a cause, and discovering a remedy.” Proudhon states that skepticism befell morality: “modern dissolution consists of this.” He delimits the domain of the effects of this skepticism: “History shows that if the safety of persons and property cannot be reached by moral doubt, it will be the same with the family and society.”

We can thus affirm that Proudhon wrote his Justice to defend, support, exalt, and return honor to these three complementary faiths: conjugal faith, judicial faith, and political faith. Let’s see what he says about the family.

The first degree of jurisdiction is marriage. Organ of justice, this latter unites, in absolute reciprocal devotion, power and grace, the valiant worker and the active homemaker.

The family is the second degree of jurisdiction. By primogeniture, the male-female couple perpetuates justice, by assuring its amplification, its development and brings us to the threshold of the city.

Elevated by his subject, Proudhon finds without trouble lyrical accents; their enthusiasm just increases the exactitude and finesse of the psychological observations of our author:

“By descent, the idea of law makes a first gain: first in the heart of the father. Paternity is the decisive moment of moral life. It’s then that man assures himself in his dignity, conceiving justice as his true good, as his glory, the monument of his existence, the most precious heritage that he can leave to his children. His name, a spotless name, to pass as a title of nobility to posterity, such is the thought that henceforth fills the soul of the familial father.”

What nobility, what beauty, what Cornelian accent in a few lines so full and so profoundly traditional! As they dominate – and from what height – the crawling councils of our “conscious generators”!

Today, in our democracy, we do not desire the child: we fear its coming, we delay it, and we prevent it by a series of practices that I do not need to expand upon. Mr. Vautour and his tenants want to see “the house without children.”

Observe a bit our modern men: morose and feeble hedonists, they have a hate bordering on sickness for the little ones. At the restaurant, on street cars, one must see the tense attitude that seizes the neighbors of a normal family. The laughs of the child, his cries, his whims, his tears, his natural turbulence exasperates our contemporaries, troubling their rest and their peaceful digestion.

You know it as well as me: It was not so in the past. They rejoiced in, they glorified having a numerous family. Grandparents and parents welcomed the new born with glee. On this point still, Proudhon was a man of the old France. He writes:

“The child is given, Parvulus natus est nobis; it’s a present from God, A deo datus, an incarnation of present divinity, Emmanuel. We nourish it with milk and honey, until he learns to discern good from evil: Butyrunn et mel comedet, donec sciai eliqere bonum et reprobare malum; it’s the religion of Justice that continues his development. In the accomplishment of this sacred duty, how can man not feel his nobility? How would the wife not become splendid?”

And the family functions thus:

“Everything,” said Proudhon, “is in the hands of the father, nourished by his work, protected by his sword, submitted to his governance, citizens of his court, heirs and followers of his thought. Justice is entirely organized and armed there: with the father, the wife, and the children, it finds its application that only extends further to the cross breeding of families and the development of the city.”

Proudhon fought divorce. Even more: according to our author, even the death of those who founded the fecund family cannot dissolve this institution both spiritual and carnal. It endures, it is perpetual.

Also Proudhon attached an extreme importance to the testament, the solemn act, “this monument of last wills, by which man acts beyond the grave” and “affirms the continuation of his presence in the family and in the society from which he departed.”

Today “we mostly end up like evildoers. No social communion, no peace for our last moments” The individual has nothing to bequeath by which he can honor himself. What importance is the future to this voracious consumer? Perish the need for heritage, if the dear “me” of the individual can throw it away, to experience some supplementary enjoyments! Proudhon speaks another language. He defends all testamentary freedom: “Far from restraining heritability, I would be in favor of extending still to friends, associates, companions, coworkers and colleagues, domestic servants themselves. It is good that man knows that his thought and his memory will not die: also, it is not inheritance that makes unequal fortunes, it only transmits them. Done from the balance of products and services, you have nothing against inheritance.”

III

Such is the teaching of Proudhon. His theses, which seem so astonishing today, are yet the most simple in the world. One only has to open his eyes, appeal to his memories, invoke his own experience to be persuaded of their correctness. On the contrary, to fight them, to declare them, disdainfully “backwards,” is necessary to commit violence or rather one must cede to their passions. I insist on this last point: that’s what makes any discussion with the demolishers of the family impossible.

Actually, they know as well as you or me that marriage must be dissoluble, that the fecund family is the first social cell, that supports and engenders all the others. All that you can tell them will teach them nothing as they’ve already understood it for a long time.

Thus the truth is known. But, on one hand, they are, like all human beings, lead by their instincts and the prefer to obey them rather than dominate them.

All would be clear, all would be very simple if the “advanced” men and women would honestly tell us: “We prefer pleasure to pain. We obey the appeal of our senses. What we want, it’s the amorous fling. We don’t have the courage to found a family, to raise children, to work for them.”

All would be exactly very simple. Our effeminate men and our emancipated women do not consent to confess their common degradation. They dissimulate behind an arsenal of so-called “elevated” arguments; they adorn it with “socialist” considerations and they treat those who persist in practicing conjugal fidelity, having a spotless home, and surrounding themselves with children as “reactionaries” and “enemies of progress”.

But democracy is yet only the indirect enemy of the family – I mean that its principles are invoked and utilized but they do not order the destruction of the family. It does not prescribe certain acts, they deduce them from its principles.

Here we state that Proudhon did not attribute to democracy the ruin and the extinction of the family. He missed out on seeing the functioning of the Third and Fourth Republic. He did not know our “advanced” press.

Moreover, Proudhon, exclusively occupied himself with making the most crude attacks on the Church, not realizing that his attacks apply equally to democracy. Recall, actually, that Proudhon spoke of the man facing death reproaching the dying Catholic for not having more regard for the goods of this world, of having “not a word neither for his friends nor for his family,” as for himself, Proudhon wanted “to look death in the face, salute his love, place his soul between the hands of his children and expire among his family.”

But if the Catholic, according to Proudhon, contemplates Hell, and consequently, Paradise too much, the Democratic state, is it not the secular equivalent of this Paradise? In his “On The Jewish Question,” Karl Marx realized it well:

“Where the political state has attained its true development, man – not only in thought, in consciousness, but in reality, in life – leads a twofold life, a heavenly and an earthly life: life in the political community, in which he considers himself a communal being, and life in civil society, in which he acts as a private individual, regards other men as a means, degrades himself into a means, and becomes the plaything of alien powers. The relation of the political state to civil society is just as spiritual as the relations of heaven to earth. The political state stands in the same opposition to civil society, and it prevails over the latter in the same way as religion prevails over the narrowness of the secular world – by likewise having always to acknowledge it, to restore it, and allow itself to be dominated by it.”

Actually, democracy invites man to be an angel, to despise his terrestrial existence, his petty life as worker, peasant, father of the family; it turns him away from this “stagnant pool;” it advises him to “enlarge his horizon,” to “hang his plow on a star”; it orders him to love all men, which I mean, all human beings fraternally mixed up. There are not even sexes any more. It’s the terrestrial paradise.

It’s the terrestrial paradise. It leads precisely right to Hell: “It’s Eloa the beautiful archangel, lover of Satan who only needed to look at her to take her.” The more we despise the flesh, the more we fall into the abyss of sexual aberrations.

See now the facts verify our assertions, as “serious” democrats are quick to cry calumny as soon as we show them some disagreeable truths.

Certainly, the democrats will make us some concessions. They do not stumble when we ask then about divorce or cohabitation.

When we show that from 1871 to our day, the birthrate has fallen from 25.4 to 18.7 per thousand, the democrats are quick to observe that a parallel decline was observed today in neighboring monarchies, as they rapidly head towards democracy. But they object, and the fact is incontestable, that despite the reestablishment of the monarchy, the French family has not ceased to dissolve, nor die out.

The argument is not to bother us. We are the first to say that under Louis XVIII, Charles X, and Louis-Philippe, our birthrate has decreased in a regular fashion. Without even being obligated to do so, we will declare that the 18th century already saw the birth of this movement. Small wonder that: the century of the effeminate Rousseau already had its free spirits and emancipated women: it’s a democratic century. After the Revolution, democracy had a century to destroy the family, as no one contests that, since 1789, democracy has never seriously been threatened in France.

But here is what is still more conclusive: in France there are 120,000 professional democrats: these are the secular teachers and schoolmarms. But it is very remarkable that the teaching corps bowed its head for feminism and Malthusianism.

There are, among these personnel, victims of the teachings they give, very honorable exceptions. They are rare, very rare especially among the youth, who go to unified socialism or anarchism, the two extreme forms of democracy.

“Every attack on marriage and the family,” said Proudhon strongly, “is a profanation of Justice, a treason towards the people and liberty, an insult to the Revolution.” But, democratic legislation multiplies these attacks.

It grants us, in the first place, divorce which Proudhon fought against with such energy: “By divorce,” he wrote, “the spouses avow their common indignity, it’s unwarranted if we can thus say, and it other terms becomes sacrilege.” But, what do we see in our democracy? Divorce is more and more frequent and we still speak of expanding it.

In matters of marriage, democratic law disregards in part paternal authority; it will finish by ignoring it completely. It thus contradicts the austere Proudhonian teaching:

“The duty of the father of the family,” our author wrote actually, “is to establish his children in honor and justice; it’s the recompense of his work and the joy of his old age to give his daughter in marriage, to choose for his son a wife with his own hand. When a son, a daughter, to his satisfy their inclinations, tramples the vow of their father, disinheritance is for him the first right and the holiest of duties.”

Ultimately, democracy attacks inheritance by means of ever heavier taxes and destined to become even more so. Nothing is easier to understand: to develop the celestial city, to make the people happy, and elevate the soul of the citizens, it needs money, lots of money, enormous amounts of money, as it’s already three quarters gone before being effective at its special destination. No machine makes less than the state. Enormous and wheezing, anemic and yet filled with bad fat, it wastes the resources of the nation and searches to procure new ones to throw into the maw of its budget. Crushing the family under the weight of its indirect contributions and monopolies, the state, insatiable, takes inheritance and tasks itself with fully consuming it after two or three generations.

Everything conspires, we see, in a democracy, to dissolve, to ruin, to annihilate the family: the laws, the actions, the ideals are against it. Divorce is expanding; feminism full of arrogance; the housewife abandons her home to become “merchandise,” an “object of consumption” that man rejects in circulation after having used it, the growing frequency of abortions; the decline of births; paternal authority despised; the heads of families and their children thrown in the street by Mr. Vautour; the multiplication of attacks on morals, that is what triumphant democracy normally gives us.

IV

“Marriage, family, city are one in the same organ,” said Proudhon, “Social destiny is integral with matrimonial destiny.” It would be necessary to write a volume to enumerate in detail the fatal effects that lead to the breakup and the extinction of the family. As for me, I will limit myself to warn those who threaten the fatherland and agricultural production.

Like you I admire the invincible arguments by which Mr. Charles Maurras established the impossibility of our democracy to safeguard national patrimony. I admired them and yet I felt that, more than once, they only had a secondary importance.

Explained better: without a doubt the logic of the regime doesn’t want us having a foreign policy. Suppose however, on one hand, politicians inferior to those we have, and, on the other hand, a France peopled by 55 million inhabitants, a France big and strong by its numerous families. It would be respected, its alliance desired; never would Germany strike Tangier and Agadir.

The foreigner knows, he sees that our bursts of energy cannot succeed, as we lack an institution at the base, the durable institution that gives existence to the fatherland.

We said, we wrote that patriotism has been reborn in France.

There are urban milieus in movements of opinion favorable to patriotism. No more, no less. A trifle suffices to destroy them: the crowds pass with extreme ease from chauvinism to Hervéism and back.

We must not forget that the family is as material as it is spiritual. First and foremost, a soil, a certain soil, held in common and transmitted as a familial inheritance. So who, since then, will interest himself in the fatherland if not the family engaged in the cultivation of this soil, interested in safeguarding it and passing on the part it possesses.

We begin to feel that families fail us. On our borders, the enemy increases his armaments, adds new corps to his formidable army. He is preparing himself to outmaneuver us, to weigh on our decisions, and, if necessary, to crush us yet. And our democrats, secretly distraught by the growing danger, do not seem to see that the France that has lost its families is no longer builds men. They get agitated, they beat themselves over the head to discover the cause of our inferiority. The spectacle would be laughable if we weren’t so directly and seriously threatened.

We must conclude. With an ease that can only be suspect, the democrats say in a light, detached, tone: “The number must not be the only thing to enter into account. We lack quantity, but we will have quality.” Such arguments are dreaming: quality is obtained by choice, by selection, from quantity. Proudhon had already said it to the feminists. The further we go, the more our adversaries will assure themselves a double advantage over us in quality and quantity.

Will we at least be better armed than our adversaries? Nothing guarantees it. We still fall back on the family. That is what furnishes new contributions to relieve their fellows. We agonize under the weight of the armed peace; Germany supports it without bending.

In the way of agricultural production, we are progressively outpaced by all our contemporaries. Our exports sag and our internal market would have been invaded a long time ago by foreign products if democracy didn’t protect the French peasant voter.

We complain about the invasion of foreign labor (métèques). Who is at fault? Firstly ourselves who have no one to substitute for them.

Agrarian progress, as well recognized by Mr. G. Sorel, does not solely consist of using perfected tools and chemical fertilizers. The highly progressive type of agriculture is provided to us by gardening, which is a biological industry demanding a very abundant workforce, well instructed and highly skilled. It’s toward that we should strive. But, we are moving away.

Why? Because we lack the workforce, because the family is extinct. The peasant, today, plays his part in the democratic concert. He goes, he comes, he circulates. He becomes bit by bit an excellent democrat. Moreover, those who leave the village return time to time to corrupt the cultivator by extolling, by teaching him the practices of these “wise guys” that are the city folk. I know few spectacles so poignant as that of the desertion of the countryside. These houses collapse, fallow fields replace cultivated fields, children taken from school to go into the fields to take the place of the missing men, nothing is so moving nor more important.

Yes, democracy is living, living well, it bursts with health. But, right beside it, the family dies, the country dies, the earth dies. Like certain flowers, democracy only flourishes in cemeteries.

But, we want to live, we want to live by working, live again in our children, to sustain our fatherland.

Since then, our way is entirely traced. As workers, as the fathers of families, as French men, our most pressing duty is to destroy democratic institutions.

American Imperialism is an Enemy of Humanity – Richard Chartrand – Le Bonnet Des Patriotes – March 17th, 2018

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American imperialism has been one of the greatest enemies of humanity for at least a century. It is the principal vector of ultraliberal globalization on the planetary scale that leads to the pillaging of resources from Third World countries by multinationals as well as the extreme exploitation that is inflicted on their working class in sweatshops. In close and firm alliance with international Zionism, American imperialism seeks to mercilessly subjugate the peoples who fight for their national independence and progressively destroy nations and cultures for the benefit of a world standardized and dominated by Anglo-Saxon civilization.

More recently this year the 11th anniversary of the September 11th attacks took place. Of course it was a tragedy that cost around 3,000 people their lives, without counting the wounded and we must sympathize with their fate. That said, the cortege of lamentations in the media in the service of the globalist oligarchy that followed these attacks is perfectly revolting and hypocritical. The official version of these events in far from being convincing and credible and can only sow doubt in our minds. It is quite legitimate to ask who profited from this crime. But as soon as people question the official version of the September 11th attacks, the fatherlandless and globalist defenders of the capitalist system raise their voices in a chorus to treat us as conspiracy theorists, anti-Semites, paranoiac minds, etc. Their will to intimidate is more than evident, as we risk sowing doubts in the population and thus undermining the immense and disproportionate power they exercise on people’s consciousnesses.

These moralizing spirits, who continually dwell on the same refrain of Islamist terrorism, become silent however before the acts of state terrorism perpetrated by the Western powers for over a century. The list is very long and we can start with the intensive Anglo-American bombings of Germany during the Second World War, which notably lead to the destruction of the city of Dresden. Hundreds of thousands of German civilians died for the goal of provoking the German government’s total capitulation. But of these were “collateral” victims and the Germans were on the “bad side” during this global conflict and represented “the supreme evil,” they deserved their fate! The German people were literally brought to their knees for the real or supposed crimes that the National Socialist regime was accused of, while the American, British, and Soviet allies perpetrated a panoply of crimes and had hands covered in blood. There was also the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, Suharto’s coup in Indonesia in 1965 and Pinochet’s coup in Chile in 1973, both financed and orchestrated by the CIA, the Vietnam War, the invasion of Panama in 1989 which caused the death of more than 3,000 people, etc. Closer to our time, there are the Israeli bombardments of the Palestinian territories and Lebanon, the invasion of Afghanistan, of Iraq, and of Libya last year. All these wars and imperialist attacks have caused a death toll infinitely higher than the September 11th attacks without exciting the indignation of the media controlled by the globalist oligarchy. Always the same double standard! The lives of American and Israeli civilians have more value than the lives of the inhabitants of countries whose leaders somehow oppose the hegemony of the American-Zionist empire, whether its the Palestinians, the Iraqis, the Libyans, the Syrians, etc.

Following the destruction of the World Trade Center towers, the Zionist American ruling elite played the sympathy card among global public opinion and used it to stir bellicose and militarist fever to the maximum in order to unleash war against Afghanistan, allegedly in order to flush out Osama Bin Laden and overturn the Taliban regime in the name of the “liberation of women.” Many American patriots instantly recognized the influence of the pro-Israel lobby in this push for war. There has been, and there still is, a real desire on the part of the neo-conservatives in the Bush administration, and now in the Obama administration, to reinforce the position of the Zionist state in the Middle East to the detriment of the Arab, Iranian, and other regimes who want to retain their national independence against the American-Zionist empire. The convergence of views between American imperialism and international Zionism has reached an extreme point and it alarms American patriots who wish that their government devoted itself to domestic problems rather than play planetary gendarme.

Immediately after the war in Afghanistan, the Zionist neo-conservatives launched the assault against the Ba’athist and socialist Iraq of Saddam Hussein under false pretexts which would precipitate this country into the greatest chaos and atrocious civil war. They even concluded alliances with the Islamists they pretended to combat! Saddam Hussein, despite all that one could criticize him for, was a secular, patriotic, and socialist leader and his government included women and Christians. The opposition movement to this war was extremely large with millions of people in the streets, including a demonstration of 200,000 people in the streets of Montréal in March 2003, one of the largest political demonstrations in the history of Québec and Canada! That but didn’t prevent the destruction of Iraqi sovereignty and the shameful pillage of this country’s natural resources by the globalist oligarchy. The war in Libya was conducted under the pretext of overthrowing a dictator, Muammar Gaddafi, and lead once again to chaos and the pillage of the natural resources that abounded in this country.

Yet there exist glimmers of hope which are far from negligible. Socialist Cuba still proudly resists the American desire to overthrow its government in order to restore the reign of exploiters and bandits and the Venezuela of Nicolas Maduro represents a thorn in the foot of the United States which has always considered Latin America as its hunting preserve. At this moment the Ba’athist and socialist Syria of Bashar Al-Assad has been at the center of current events for a year due to the civil war encouraged and supported by NATO with the goal of overthrowing his government and replacing it with a clique entirely devoted to and subject to American-Israeli hegemony in the Middle East. The existence of the Québec independence movement disturbs American imperialism, which sees it as a factor of destabilization in North America. In the 1970s, the Yankee oligarchy brandished the specter of a Cuba of the North if Québec separated. That’s what explains the constant desire of the Parti Québécois to reassure American investors about the consequences of Québec’s independence, but this concern is far from shared by all Québécois patriots, who instead see American imperialism as an adversary in their struggle for national and social emancipation. In short, there are many resistances facing the attacks and imperialist diktats of the New World Order and social nationalists have the duty to support them with the goal of promoting the fall of the globalized and countryless capitalism. This is how we can construct a political, economic, and social system based on social nationalism, the only alternative to globalist chaos and the progressive destruction of nations and national identities.

Source:http://www.lebonnetdespatriotes.net/lbdp/index.php/dossierslbdp/la-parole-a-nos-lecteurs/item/18503-limp%C3%A9rialisme-am%C3%A9ricain-est-un-ennemi-de-lhumanit%C3%A9

On the History of the “Landvolkbewegung” – The Black Flags of the Peasant Movement (1929 – 1931) – Jan Ackermeier – zur Zeit n°11 – 2014

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The peasant revolt movement that shook Schleswig-Holstein between 1928 and 1932 arose from an unprecedented agricultural crisis. It was initiated by Claus Heim, “the peasant general,” who took leadership of it and staged many demonstrations and explosive attacks. However the questions he posed largely surpassed the framework of Schleswig-Holstein’s economic history. Its development actually coincided with period of the National Socialist party’s formidable progress in the rural milieus of this province, which would be, in July 1932, the first region in Germany to vote with an absolute majority for the NSDAP. What historic originality can this farmer’s revolt represent?

After the first world war, the majority of German peasants were confronted with enormous economic difficulties. In order to be able to somehow supply the population with food, German agriculture, from the start of the Weimar Republic and until 1922, had been forced to accept a constraining, managed policy, willingly or not. This policy aroused a general rejection of the young Republic in the large strata of the peasantry who traditionally voted for liberal or conservative groupings.

This negative tendency was further accentuated during the years of heavy inflation (1922 and 1923). At first, the peasants, as owners of land and tangible goods, profited from the devaluation of Germany currency. Later however, with the introduction of the “Rentenmark” in 1923, they were forced to endure heavy economic sacrifices. Above all when it became necessary to back the new currency through mortgages imposed by public authorities on landholdings in the agricultural sector the rejection of the Republic became widespread: this policy was perceived as a terrible injustice, as a special sacrifice demanded from the peasantry alone.

Towards the middle of the 1920s, the peasants had to confront a dilemma: buy agricultural machinery in order to consolidate their hitherto little mechanized enterprises, in order to be able to produce more and compensate for the deficits caused by the increase in the prices of industrial goods. During the years of inflation, the peasants practically had nothing to capitalize on: they consequently saw themselves forced to take out credit on very disadvantageous conditions in order to finance the necessary new investments. But, from 1927, they could foresee the global economic crisis where prices, in agricultural markets, fell on the international scale; moreover, disastrous harvests in 1927, due to deplorable climactic conditions, lead many peasants to bankruptcy.

Heim

In 1931, the peasant dissidents opted for the black flag of peasant revolt, hoisted in the revolts of the 16th century. The black flag was “the flag of earth and misery, the German night and the state of emergency.”

It was especially in rural Schleswig-Holstein, with a sector largely dominated by livestock and livestock speculation, that numerous peasants were threatened. They could no longer pay taxes or interest. Bankruptcy was waiting for them. This critical situation lead the peasants of the region to rally in a protest movement because traditional peasant associations, the government of the Reich (rendered incapable of acting because of its heterogeneous composition) or the established parties couldn’t help them. This protest movement didn’t present clear organizational structures but instead was characterized by a sort of spontaneity, where some determined peasants rapidly mobilized their counterparts in order to organize formidable mass demonstrations.

In January 1928, Schleswig-Holstein was the theater of numerous peaceful mass demonstrations, where sometimes more than 100,000 peasants descended into the streets. The representatives of the peasantry then asked the government of the Reich to establish an emergency aid program. The peasantry radicalized and within it ever more numerous voices rose to demand the dissolution of the “Weimar sytem.” The leaders of the movement had always been moderate: they limited themselves to demanding timely measures in the domains of agriculture and livestock alone. Faced with incomprehension by the Reich’s authorities, these moderate men were quickly replaced by more politicized activists who henceforth demanded that the entire “Weimar system” be abolished and destroyed in order to replace it with a form of popular (folkish) state, whose contours were poorly defined by its advocates, but which could essentially be qualified as agrarian.

At the end of the year 1928, the movement took the name Landvolkbewegung (Rural People’s Movment), under the direction of Claus Heim, from the countryside of Dithmarschen, and Wilhelm Hamkens, from Eiderstedt. Together they financed and published a journal, Das Landvolk, together with “guard associations” (Wachvereiningungen), a type of paramilitary unit lead by former Freikorps combatants. The movement thus acquired a form of organization that it didn’t posses before.

In 1928, Heim launched an appeal to boycott taxes. Suddenly, public protests were no longer passive: they were followed by strong armed actions and even terrorist attacks. The bailiffs who came to seize the property of bankrupt peasants were set upon and driven out with violence. The small city of Neumünster was subjected to a boycott on the part of peasants who refused to go there to buy commodities and materials. The opponents of the movement fell victim to explosive attacks, designed to intimidate them. Following these explosive attacks, the agitators where pursued by justice and condemned to prison. The movement was broken.

Interview with General Perón – La Nation Européenne, No. 30, February 1969 – Conducted in Madrid, November 7th 1968.

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Juan Domingo Perón was born in Lobos, Argentina, in 1895. A colonel in 1941. He participated in the coup of June 1943. Supported by Argentine workers (the descamisados), he was freed by them on October 17th 1945 after a brief incarceration. He was elected president of the Republic on February 24th 1946.

Advised by Miranda, he expropriated big enterprises, nationalized the central bank, railways, and external commerce. In 1947 a 5 year plan of industrialization was implemented. Perón turned away from the United States and signed important economic agreements with France and England. The Argentine army, instigated by the American secret services, staged a coup in September 1955. They fired cannon against the workers who demonstrated in favor of Perón. Hundreds died. Once Perón left, the bourgeoisie recovered its factories, its bank accounts, its privileges. The local plutocracy, entirely in the hands of the United States, restored colonial capitalism.

For having wanted to laicize the Argentine Republic (institution of divorce in 1954 – separation between Church and State in 1955) Rome used the pretext of the expulsion of the auxiliary bishop of Buenos Aires to excommunicate Perón. An interesting marriage to observe in 1955: the Church and Wall Street against the socialist general. Perón’s socialist theory was named Justicialism.

Jean Thiriart: Juan Perón, firstly, could you speak to us about the work you just published, La Hora de los pueblos?

General Perón: In this book, I wanted to give a complete overview of imperialist influence and domination in Latin America. I think that Latin American countries are on the way towards their liberation. Of course, this liberation will be long and difficult, as it concerns the totality of countries in Latin America. In effect, it is unthinkable that there is a free man in an enslaved country, nor a free country in an enslaved continent. During the ten years of Justicialist government in Argentina, we lived freely in a sovereign nation. Nobody could interfere in our internal affairs without coming into conflict with us. But, in ten years, the international synarchy, that is to say the ensemble of imperialist forces that dominate the world, defeated us. A fifth column, the sepoys as we would call them in reference to India, scientifically carried out an effective undermining job and the regime that I presided over was overthrown. This proves that if peoples can liberate themselves from the imperialist yoke, it is consequently much more difficult for them to preserve their independence, as the international forces I just denounced regain control. In this sense, the failure of Justicialism should be a lesson and an experience, among many others, alas, for all the countries that want to free themselves and remain free.

We must envision the struggle for the liberation of Latin American countries as a global struggle, on the level of the continent. In this struggle, each country is in solidarity with its neighbors, upon which it must find support. The first imperative for these countries is thus to unite, to integrate. The second point is to realize the effective alliance with the third world, as we, my collaborators and myself, have advocated for 25 years! We must point out this way to the South American people; not only the leaders, but also to the popular masses that must be made aware of the necessity of this struggle against imperialism. To unify the continent and free it from external influences, to ally with the third world, such are the first objectives. Consequently, the process of internal liberation can unfold: the people will obtain the government they demand every day and that has unceasingly been refused to them, hence this succession of ephemeral dictatorships and puppet governments put in place thanks to schemes, but never elections, which allows them to keep the people under different forms of domination. This is the process that my book seeks to make the popular masses understand.

Jean Thiriart: Is there, in South America, a social class, a bourgeoisie that systematically collaborates with the United States?

General Perón: Unfortunately yes! In our country, the division between the people and an oligarchy of fortune, of birth, is very sharp, likewise with the people and the new business bourgeoisie that has developed very quickly. A powerful oligarch sleeps in each industrialist enriching himself. This oligarchy dominates the country, but we must not underestimate the breadth of the immense mass’ struggle that demands its freedom. We have initiated this movement, in a certain measure, in the ten years of Justicialist government. Justicialism is a form of socialism, a national socialism, which corresponds to the necessities and conditions of Argentinian life. It is natural for socialism to drive the masses and consequently, in their name, flare up social claims. It created an entirely new system, totally different from the old democratic liberalism that dominated the country and shamelessly put itself in the service of Yankee imperialism.

Jean Thiriart: In Europe, the Americans have corrupted all political tendencies, from the extreme right to the extreme left. There are collaborators, sold to the United States, as much among the socialists as among the Catholics and the liberals. The Americans manage to buy every party. Do you observe the same phenomenon in Latin America?

General Perón: Exactly. The Americans use the same technique everywhere in the world. Firstly, they proceed through economic penetration, through the intermediary of this oligarchy of which I just spoke, who finds substantial interests there … Next, there are more or less direct political pressures, in all political sectors. Thus, if they do not buy them, control them, the Americans try to rupture and divide national political forces. The CIA has mastered the art of organizing provocations. These objectives attained, they then attack military milieus, which they penetrate through different means, of which the most effective is certainly the liberal application of bribery. That’s how they operated in South Vietnam, through the intermediary of a few military advisers whose principal activity was bribing the generals whose moral integrity was already very far from being irreproachable, who didn’t say no to the disbursement of considerable financial advantages (for example, massive allocation of shares in foreign corporations or nominations to the executive management of corporations). These men won over by American imperialism, all that remains for them is to organize a military coup to establish a dictatorship, as is the case in Argentina, as was the case in Brazil, in Ecuador, and recently in Peru and Panama. The method is always the same. In the last stage, once the situation is under control, the Americans then begin to monopolize all the economic wealth of the country, by systematically silencing all political and social opposition forces. Such is the mechanism, in South America, in Asia, in Europe, and elsewhere.

Jean Thiriart: There it’s even stronger. In Europe, the Americans have succeeded in controlling the movements whose official goal is European unification! Thus in Brussels, the pro-European movements in parallel with the common market have been subjected to such infiltration that they now proclaim “we must make Europe with the Americans.” Which is evidently stupid because European unification, as we have shown many times in La Nation européenne, implies the departure of the Americans. But the latter are so clever that they have even taken the European movement in hand to smother it, to make it fail!

But returning to Latin America. Do certain governments try to resist American penetration?

General Perón: Practically not, as we are in a phase of nearly absolute domination. There are, of course, a few governments which are not gangrened by American imperialism, but in the general context submission, they have a paltry and aleatory character, due to isolation, the measures they adopt to face this imperialism fail to rally a true opposition. On the other hand, all the revolutionary opposition movements against imperialism are hunted down, in Argentina particularly. That’s equally true everywhere in the world, because all countries, in general, are more or less dominated, directly or indirectly, through imperialist influence, whether it’s American or Soviet imperialism. Both, basically, agree to share the world amiably.

Jean Thiriart: For you, the liberation of Argentina alone, or Chile alone, seemed fated to fail. According to you, the different liberation movements must be concurrent and operate on the continental scale. Are you a resolute partisan of integration?

General Perón: Yes. Because I believe in a certain historical determinism, The world has always been under the iron rule of an imperialism. Today we have the misfortune to have to fight against two accomplice imperialisms. But the power of imperialism follows a parabolic arc, and once it reaches the highest point on the vertical axis, the summit of the arc, decadence begins. In my opinion, the imperialisms have already entered into the phase of decadence. We have seen that they cannot be overthrown or shaken from the outside, except through the integration of all means of struggle and all concerned forces. But this sacred union is long and hard to realize, which allows the imperialisms to live happily. Yet a danger threatens them: they rot from the inside and this corruption is already very advanced, in North America as in Russia. We must use that to precipitate the process of degradation.

To achieve this, a conflict would be futile no matter how heroic.

I believe that we have arrived in a phase of humanity’s history that will be marked by the decline of the great powers of domination. We’ve reached the end of an evolution of humanity which, since the cavemen until our days, has been made through integration. From the individual to the family, to the tribe, to the city, to the feudal state, to present day nations, we arrive at continental integration. Currently, outside of a few colossi, the USA, Russia, China, a single country doesn’t represent a great force in the future, in a world where Europe will integrate, like America or Asia, small isolated nations can no longer survive. Today, to live with the means of power, we must join a bloc that already exists or is yet to be created. Europe will unify or succumb. The year 2000 will see a Europe unified or dominated. It will be the same for Latin America.

A united Europe would count a population of nearly 500 million inhabitants. The South American continent already counts more than 250 million. Such blocs would be respected and effectively oppose subjugation to imperialism which is the lot of weak and divided countries.

Jean Thiriart: Do you believe that the work of agitation undertaken by Fidel Castro is useful for the Latin American cause?

General Perón: Absolutely. Castro is a promoter of liberation. He has to appeal to one imperialism because the proximity of the other threatens to crush him. But the objective of the Cubans is the liberation of the peoples of Latin America. They have no other intention but to constitute a bridgehead for the liberation of the continental countries. Che Guevara is a symbol of this liberation. He was great because he served a great cause, ending up embodying it. He was the man of an ideal. Many great men are passed over unnoticed because they didn’t have a noble cause to serve. On the other hand, simple, normal men, far from being predestined to such a role, weren’t superhuman, but men who quite simply became great heroes because so they could better serve a noble cause.

Jean Thiriart: Do you have the impression that the Soviets prevent Castro from pursuing important action in Latin America? That they restrain Castro in order to stop him from surpassing a certain level of agitation?

General Perón: Perfectly. The Russians play this role not only in Cuba, but in other countries. Thus, Guevara, after having accomplished his mission in Cuba, left for Africa to enter into contact with the African communist movement. But the leaders of this movement had received the order to impede Guevara. Guevara had to leave Africa because the Russians were at work there: a conflict pitted the Congo against two concurrent imperialisms. The two opposed tendencies that they represent can, at certain moments, unite their forces to defend the same cause: that of the established order. It’s logical, they defend imperialism, and not the freedom of the people!

Jean Thiriart: What would you think about the establishment of a global system of information and communication between all the tendencies that fight against Russian and American imperialism, and the collective pursuit of a certain number of political efforts?

General Perón: We must consider unification to be the principal objective of all those who fight for the same cause. I say unification and not union or association. We need to integrate. Because we will soon have the occasion to act, and we must be integrated and not only associated for an effective action.

Jean Thiriart: So you believe we must go very far, much further than simple connections, in the tactical alliance with the enemies of American imperialism. Even with Castro, the Arabs, Mao Zedong if it’s necessary? You think that the enemy is so powerful, so invasive, that we must come together in order to defeat it, leaving aside ideological differences?

General Perón: I’m not communist. I’m Justicialist. But I don’t have the right to demand that China be Justicialist also. If the Chinese want to be communists, why would we want to “make them happy” against their will at any price? They are free to choose the regime that they wish for, even if it’s different than ours. Everyone is sovereign in what concerns their internal affairs. But if the Chinese fight against the same imperialist domination as us, then they are our companions in struggle. Mao himself said: “The first thing to distinguish is the real identity of friends and enemies. Then we can act.” I am a partisan of tactical alliances, according to the formula: the enemies of our enemies are our friends.

Jean Thiriart: Thank you. I have now finished with my questions. Would you like to make a declaration of particular subjects?

General Perón: I regularly read La Nation Européenne and I entirely share its ideas. Not only concering Europe but the world. One criticism, I would prefer to the title La Nation Européenne, the title Monde nouveau [The New World]. Because in the future, Europe alone will not have all the sufficient resources for the defense of its interests. Today, particular interests often defend themselves in very far away places. Europe should think about it. It must integrate, certainly, but in integrating, it should also keep close contacts with other countries in the process of integrating. Latin America in particular, an essential element that must ally with Europe. We, Latin Americans, are Europeans, and not from the American tendency. I personally feel more French, more Spanish, or more German than American. The old Jew Disraeli was quite right when he said: “Peoples have neither permanent friends nor permanent enemies, they have permanent interests,” we must unite these interests, even if they are geographically distant, so that Europe can continue to be the first civilizing power in the world.

Georges Sorel: Socialism and Violence – Ange Sampieru, revue Orientations n°11 (July 1989).

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For the majority of our contemporaries, the mention of Georges Sorel most often recalls the analysis of the theorist of violence. His most famous work, “Reflections on Violence” (1908), constitutes an irreplaceable contribution to the revolutionary myth. We know the importance that the concept of “myth” held for this exceptional thinker. The Sorelian revolutionary myth was inspired by a polemological vision of social relations. Violence informs revolutionary action and invests it with a realist conception of history. As the means to act upon the present, the proletarian myth is a tool in the service of the anti-bourgeois revolution. It’s also a conceptual tool that must firstly oppose both socialist utopianism and liberal conservatism. This very original discourse, an activist discourse par excellence, gives Sorel’s work a privileged place in our conception of socialism.

Before addressing the analysis of the myth of violence as the idea-force of Sorel, it is useful to present the man and his work. Starting from this recognition of the ideological environment we can, in the second part, present the characteristics of this “violence” as myth, and the conclusions that derive from our own position.

 

 

I. Sorel: Man and Work

 

 

Georges Sorel (1847-1922) began his career in 1889. It was the era of the first French translations of Marx’s work. One could already find “Capital” and “Socialism: Utopian and Scientific” in the library; though one had to wait until 1895 for the publication of the famous “Manifesto of the Communist Party.” In France, it is a fact that Marxism constituted an ideological movement much more than a revolutionary party in 1889. And it was in 1893 that Sorel converted to Marxism. Sorel’s rapprochement would mark his entire work. That doesn’t imply any blind attachment to Marxist values. His character was too independent for his thoughts to be inscribed within a total system. But incidentally, who was Sorel? His character has been the subject of numerous analyses as brilliant as they are contradictory. For some, Sorel is a thinker attached to the rationalist school. For others, he would be a remarkable advocate of the irrational. In his political opinions, he appears to some as a revolutionary conservative (a rare species in his time); for others, he is a neo-Marxist. And the works abound that seek to definitively prove the scientific basis of one opinion or another. For our part, we will not enter into this debate.

We will follow a chronological analysis, split into successive phases, where each layer supports a part of the following thought. It is undeniable that Sorel was seduced by the radical novelty of Marxist texts at a moment of his evolution. How could an intellectual of his era, open to new ideas, in correspondence with numerous European intellectuals of all tendencies (we cite for the record Roberto Michels, Benedetto Croce), not have been attracted by a revolutionary discourse proposing a “scientific” reading of history and misery. But we must not believe in the “Marxism”, orthodox or not, of Sorel. Likewise, we don’t believe in the so-called “fascism” of Sorel, which is difficult to attach of the (historical) contemporary idea that we’ve made of it today, where 66 years have elapsed since Mussolini’s seizure of power. The work of Sorel is much more complex.

According to Paolo Pastori (Rivoluzione e continuita in Proudhon e Sorel, Giuffre, Roma, 1980, 244 p.), the work of Sorel constitutes “an alternative to reactionary conservatism and revolutionary progressivism.” He adds that Sorelian thought surpasses the traditional oppositions of modern thought, between, on one hand, theories of natural law, and, on the other, subjective theories of law, absolute rationalism and free will. The political conclusion of the ideology is a “pluralist” revolution, which restores an open society, if only to counter the threat of capitalism’s social entropy. Modernity is not denied, it is integrated into an organic communitarian whole. Closer to Proudhon than Marx, Sorel adhered to the ideological foundations of the French socialist thinker. Namely:

1) A plural conception of reason. Marxist in an absolute and monist rationalism which, like capitalism, prescribes a desiccated social project.

2) A multidimensional vision of man. Marxism is a dangerous reductionism for man (due to its economic determinism) and society (the mechanics of the class struggle). Taking into account a social dialectic that refuses the capitalist worker/entrepreneur dualism and recognizes a richer set of social relations.

3) A project of social synthesis, where the sense of equilibrium of (emerging) social classes underlines the authority/freedom, individual/community, past/present dialectic.

 

 

Sorel and Proudhon: A Relation of Continuity

 

 

There is without a doubt a relation of continuity between Sorel and Proudhon. Sorel was a student of Proudhon, who actualized his thought during different phases of his investigations. According to Pastori, Sorel was first a liberal conservative (1889-1892, then a “strict obedience” Marxist (1893-1896); this second phase lead to a period of revision of deterministic and scientist Marxism, to end up in a return to Marx’s thought in 1905-1908, which would ultimately be abandoned in 1910-1911. This latter phase constitutes a point of return to Proudhon’s thought for Sorel. So we will understand Sorel better if we attach ourselves to the task of a serious study of the author of “La Guerre et la paix” and “La capacité politique des classes ouvrières”…

Proudhon was a revolutionary thinker in the 19th century of the bourgeois reason. Attached to the idea, Proudhon could not be considered a “rationalist” in the common sense of the term. Proudhon distinguishes many categories of the concept of reason: human reason, natural reason, practical reason, on one hand, and, on the other, public reason and particular reason. Human reason is the superior faculty of conceiving “the ideal that is the expression of the free creative capacity of historical groups and persons.” Contrasted to the rationalism of bourgeois thought and the scientific pretension of Marxism, Proudhon strongly claims the space of freedom of historical thought for social groups and man, who is conceived as a being of culture unconditioned by absolute determinisms.

This first reason is limited in turn by the reason called, in Proudhonian language, “natural reason” or “the reason of things.” It is objective necessity, which restrains the demiurgical aspirations of man within certain unsurpassable limits. Practical reason is the final synthesis of the preceding two. Through it one can understand the confrontation of the 2 reasons, that of the free man not determined by material mechanism, and that of the reality which is the frontier of human creative powers. Proudhon drew from a pragmatic conception. The second category breaks into public or general reason, and particular reason, the reproduction of “the instance of universality” (necessity) and that of particularity (freedom). The non-coincidence of the mentioned reasons implies a radical critique of “absolutist” systems of thought, totalitarian systems of thought (Marxism, Jacobinism, and democratic Rousseauism). Proudhon, the militant anti-totalitarian, privileged particular reason. This “pluralist rationalism” thus informs Proudhon’s socio-political concept.

 

 

The Serial Dialectic of Proudhon

 

 

The theory of series is a necessary element to understand his thought. Proudhon distinguishes two separate movements in every process: the first is division-individuation (the constitution of simple series), the second is the recomposition of unity – totality (the constitution of composite series). Proudhon also affirms the independence of the series’ orders and the impossibility of a universal science (De la création de l’ordre dans l’humanité). Paolo Pastori speaks of Proudhon’s “serial dialectic”, which opposes the Hegelian dialectic, and is similar to the Croce’s dialectic of instincts. This serial dialectic confirms Proudhon’s refusal of all reductionist analysis. Social existence cannot be reduced to a single reference point, universal and determinant. Proudhonian sociology, which Sorel reprised in turn, is a “sociology of composition” (the division of labor and organization, the recognition of rural and industrial economies, central functions and decentralization).

This aspect of Proudhon and Sorel’s thought is opposed to the uni-dimensional tendencies of capitalist society. It’s historical form, liberal economics, confuses freedom and free competition, creating a “new anti-organic and anti-political feudalism.” Proudhon was not the enemy of individual initiative. He subjected it to his theory of series. Namely: the subjective moment of individual initiative, and the objective one of submission of the collective aims of the people.

The concomitant apology for the rural world constitutes, among French socialists, a veritable critique of the “economic reduction of human reality” (Idée générale de la Révolution). But this apology should not be confused with any reactionary attachment to the peasant world. The socialist ideology of Proudhon defends agricultural production without attaching it to the values of the right, as the French state did between 1940 and 1944. Earth and industry are two factors of labor and production bound by an encompassing system of federations. And the revolution is “the refusal of the multidimensional social order’s reduction to a single economic purpose” (P. Pastori, op. cit.).

The revolution is not a simple movement of destruction or class contestation (the French Revolution was the movement of the overly restricted bourgeoisie in a traditional society where the dominant values were those of the aristocracy – social values – and the monarchical state – political values). Against this misguided idea of revolution, the French socialists (Proudhon and Sorel) had a revolutionary conception of balance. Synthesis of apparently contradictory values: individuality and community, private property and public interest.

Concerning property, for example, the French socialists opposed both its radical elimination (communism) and its current condition. The bourgeoisie denies the social meaning of property. Socialist property recognizes it. Thus the constant valorization of justice among these thinkers, as the focal point of the new society they envisioned. And, with Proudhon, and then Sorel, the development of a federalist, anti-economic and anti-bourgeois (including the parliamentary socialists in this latter category) discourse.

 

 

Seductive Marxist Discipline and Deterministic Rigor

 

 

One must remark that Sorel remained in a critical position regarding the work of Proudhon, which accused of tendencies towards a “systemic mind.” The “ontologization” of Justice is the philosophical foundation of the apology for balance. Beyond this criticism, Sorel nevertheless remained a faithful student of Proudhon. He joins Proudhon in his reflections on liberty, which is the Gordian knot of the socialist ethic. Faced with bourgeois individualism, Sorel turned towards a radical socialism, a socialism of combat. Marxism then represented a seed of order in the face of the chaos created by the bourgeoisie’s capitalism. The world of production then underlies this cultural revolution proclaimed by Sorel. Sorel is the partisan of practical – political reason, shadowed by a historicist conception.

Starting from 1896, Sorel underwent an evolution that distanced him from this determinist reason. His philosophical critique of positivism extended itself to a political discourse where “absolute reason” held the sovereign role. There was, Pastori writes, “a radical rupture with the rigid materialist schema of orthodox Marxism.”And, in 1898, Sorel turned again towards Proudhon more seriously: he then wrote “L’avenir socialiste des syndicats.” The revolution that establishes the dictatorship of the proletariat was rejected by Sorel. He accused this project of masking the dictatorship of intellectuals. Behind the final and properly “apocalyptic” conception of proletarian revolution, understood in the Marxist sense, one easily recognizes an economic – intellectual tyranny, a despotic ideocracy. Sorel proposes a revolutionary first act to the proletariat: definitively reject the dictatorship of intellectuals, which reproduces the external discipline of capitalism. In its place, it is necessary to establish an internal discipline, that Sorel would qualify as “moral.” According to Pastori, in 1903 Sorel finally rejoined Proudhon once and for all, leaving the dangerous ground of orthodox Marxism. He then wrote his “Introduction à l’économie moderne.” On two points Sorel was especially Proudhonian: private property must be conserved, which is a serious guarantee of the citizens’ freedom. This social property challenges the bourgeois form of “abstract property” where the owner of the means of production is not the producer. The second point: restore the ideal of a “harmonious interplay of individual, familial, and social interests” that animated Roman antiquity. Sorel also proposes a judicial order quite distant from “political rationalism.” It proclaims the emergence of new “social authorities.” Finally, he gives the role of mediator and initiator to the state.

 

 

Myth: The Spiritual Tool of Mobilization

 

 

Furthermore Sorel developed a theory of social myths. Myth is the necessary synthesis between reason and “that which is not rational.” Myth is a symbolic translation of the real, which authorizes and fosters a total mobilization of the masses. In this sense, myth is the opposite of intellectual rationalism, for example the intellectual rationalism of the Marxists. Without contesting this “reason of things” of which Proudhon spoke and the “objective gravity” that results from it, Sorel retains myth as the spiritual tool of mobilization. The social order and its ideological dependencies (like law) are founded upon a common conception of the world, a vision of the social and the political that doesn’t reduce to a pure rational discourse. Order is the joint result of this ensemble of images (myth) and popular will (mobilization).

This position would be the object of a new revision provoked by the “Dreyfusard revolution” of 1905-1908. For Pastori, there is a return to a “dichotomous” conception: Sorel was split between the ongoing relationship between the rational and the irrational and revolutionary rupture as a total and irrational explosion. We find this division in his writings collected under the title of “Reflections on Violence.” Sorel distinguishes the general syndicalist strike (the creation of a new order) and the general political strike (we will prefer to say: political – partiocratic), that is to say, exploited and directed by social-parliamentary politicos. Revolution is a creative spirit, that the strike conveys and which consists of a total critique of the existing order. The figure of the revolutionary hero emerges: the syndicalist is the virtuous warrior of this revolution, driven by the values of sacrifice, by the desire for overcoming. Sorel analyzes certain traditional institutions as exemplars of a revolutionary structure: for example the Catholic Church, both as a secular actor and as an institution whose members are devoted to an absolute. Transcendent idealism and direct and permanent action on history are the two qualities of a revolutionary party. In 1910, Sorel wrote that the Church was an elite one.

This was also the era where Sorel reflected upon the questions of Roman law and the historical institutions that composed the ancient social order. Namely and principally patriarchy. He distinguishes three sources of the juridical spirit: war, family, property. War is one of the dimensions of the dialectic of social relations. And revolution must use this plurality of relations to its benefit, not in the name of a catastrophic finality (the final revolution of orthodox Marxism), but for the reestablishment of this “subsidiary justice,” the foundation of the juridical order. Sorel uncompromisingly excluded relations with the party of the bourgeois who “reduce everything to an economic tool.” This a certain fascination for the Bolshevik revolution, which was not the residue of any ideological attachment to Marxism, but a recognition of a revolution whose acts were total. Perhaps it was also a desire to really demarcate his thought from the social- reformism that he execrated above all (Sorel spoke of the “hyper-legalistic socialism of our doctors of reformist high politics” in “Introduction à l’économie moderne”, cited by Marc Rives : À propos de Sorel et Proudhon in Cahiers G. Sorel n°1, 1983).

 

 

II. Socialism and Violence

 

 

 

Sorel is a great thinker not so much for his works as for the originality of his reflections and the “marginality” of his positions. Who was Sorel? A traditionalist, a Marxist, a Dreyfusard, a champion of revolutionary syndicalism and voluntarist nationalism, or a Leninist in heart and mind? Certain men are resistant to any classification. Labels cannot manage to hold them in one case and masters of classification have insurmountable difficulties “normalizing” this type of man. Yet certain researchers have tried to better identify Sorel. We cite for the record: “Georges Sorel, Der revolutionäre Konservatismus” by Michael Freund (Klostermann, 1972) ; “Notre maître G. Sorel” by Pierre Andreu (1982) ; and finally “Georges Sorel : het einde van een mythe,” by J. de Kadt (1938).

For Claude Polin, the question is clear: is a man who was in turn an admirer of Marx, Péguy, Lénine and Le Play, Proudhon, Nietzsche, Renan, James, Maurras and Bergson, Hegel and Mussolini, etc. muddle headed? His response was just as direct: this is where apparent chaos hides a logic off the beaten path of academic thought. Sorel is a man of intuitions. At the same time he was one who refuses total systems of the thought, which many of his contemporaries wanted to impose as the “unsurpassable horizons of their time” (for example Comte’s positivism and Marxism). Sorel expressed this freedom of thought, this desire to not enclose his thought on the world and society in a frozen and mechanical ideological framework in one of his strongest works: “Reflections on Violence.”

In his work on the “revolutionary right,” following “Ni droite, ni gauche,” the historian Z. Sternhell titles one of his chapters: “The revolution of the moralists.” Sorel is presented in this chapter as one of the most remarkable representatives of this “moralist” current. Faced with the liberal revisionism of Bernstein and Jaurès, attached to traditional liberal values (regarding these values, Lafargue spoke of “metaphysical prostitutes,” cited by Sternhell p.81), the “moralists” were the men who refused any dishonorable compromise: comprise with the values of bourgeois society, compromise with materialism in all its forms, that is to say Marxist or bourgeois (we find this same sentiment regarding materialism in other European groups of the era: Congrès de Hoppenheim (1928), Congrès du Parti Ouvrier Belge (the manifesto of July 3rd 1940), where De Man evokes a spiritual and ethical revolution before the delegates.) One finds the myth of violence at the origin of this “ethical socialism.”

 

 

Violence, The Proletariat, and the General Strike

 

 

Firstly it is useful not to confuse Sorelian violence with the physical forms of violence that our modern societies expose us to. With Sorel, the notion of violence is linked with two other equally essential notions: that of the “proletariat” (the monopolist of this violence) and that of the “general strike,” which is the arm of the revolution. There is actually an intimate link between the general strike and the exercise of violence. The general strike is the privileged and singular expression of the violence of the proletariat in contemporary history. It is, Sorel wrote, an “act of war,” similar to that of an army on campaign. The general strike occurs without hate and without the spirit of vengeance. Sorel wrote: “In war, one doesn’t kill the vanquished.”

The effective and present day use of physical violence is not equivalent to the violence of the general strike. This violence is a sort of “military demonstration” of proletarian force. The death of others is only an accident of violence, it is not its essence. Sorel contrasts bourgeois military violence and limited warlike proletarian violence. Thus Sorel’s violence is an attitude, an attitude of determination against the adversary. Violence is an idea that promotes mobilization and the action arises from it. Sorel also wrote: “We have to act.”

This viewpoint also explains the Sorelian contempt of the intellectual class, incapable of all offensive action, ignorant of the terrain of combat. On the contrary, one can remark that these same intellectuals who refuse reality’s contact with the real are bloodthirsty leaders. The “violence” of intellectuals in power (Sorel perhaps thought of the revolution of 1791 and the repression of 1870) is erratic, cruel, and terrorist. The violence that they exercise is pathological. It transcribes their inability to unify the masses around their values. Sorelian violence is opposed to this violence – one thinks of the violence of the Jacobins in 1791, the Leninist violence of the NEP against the peasants of Ukraine, etc. – because it has full understanding of its dignity, its generosity. Sorel refers to a warrior’s violence, which, as with Clausewitz, is the mark of a will. Violence is a manifestation of determination, of surety in its objectives and its ideal.

This idea of “creative violence” unfolds in a historical myth for Sorel: the general strike. Willed violence is an idea that must present itself as a historical act. The idea animates a will and the myth mediates the relation between the real (the general strike) and the idea. Myth, wrote Sorel, is the realization of hopes in actions, not in the service of a doctrine, because doctrines and systems are intellectual speculations beyond the field of action and the interests of the proletarians, Violence is doctrine as deed, it is pure will and not the representation of thought. The idea of the general strike is “an organization of images,” a collective instinct and a general feeling that manifests in the war of modern socialism against bourgeois society. And Sorel returns to this notion of intuition, which is not reducible to a clear, precise, essentially mechanical classification of aligned and normalized ideas. With Sorel, violence is similar to the Bergsonian idea. Polin wrote: “In violence, the myth becomes what it is.” The notion of confusion between becoming and intuition plays the same role with both our authors.

 

 

Revolutionary Syndicalism Against Social Reformism

 

 

Finally, violence is the womb of a proletarian socialism. Sorel’s socialism is born from this violence, it is not social reformism. Sorel puts his confidence in revolutionary syndicalism to build this socialism. The syndicate is what binds the living forces of the proletariat. Sorel’s socialism refuses the socialism of the dream or parliamentary eloquence, the socialism of the parties and the intellectuals who lead the proletariat to a hollow socialism. We cite Sorel again: “The syndicate: the entire future of socialism resides in the autonomous development of workers’ syndicates” (Matériaux pour une théorie du prolétariat). And Polin accurately notes that the syndicate is “the Cogito of the proletariat” in Sorel ideas.

Sorel considers the syndicate as the linchpin of the revolution. The syndicates are the natural groupings of the proletariat. They are the crucible of its manifest will of liberation. The syndicate, which excludes intellectuals and parliamentarians, is an authentic community of combat. Sorel also said to the Marxists that the true Marxist is one who understands that Marxism is useless for the working masses. The syndicate acts for itself, for those who are its members. It doesn’t follow party programs and professionals of thought. The latter, who Sorel called “doctors of the little science”, had a corporatist reaction to this judgment that Sorel mocked. Sorel put the intellectuals of the bourgeois parties and the intellectual of proletarian pretensions back to back. He denounced their inherently parasitic nature. The utopia of their speeches is reactionary. The intellectual blocks the revolutionary movement and alienates the thought of the workers. The revolution is thought in action. The revolution of the intellectuals is pure image.

But we must not confound “violent action” and “action for action’s sake.” Sorel, Polin summarizes, is not a nihilist thinker. Agitation is not revolution. Violence doesn’t limit itself to a series of shocks. Violence engenders actions that Sorel calls “epic actions.” The revolutionary epic is not negativist, it is negative social entropy. Violence is the highest form of action, because it has the ultimate ability to create. In this sense, it is the empowerment of actors, the nobility of combatants, the overcoming of the self. It awakens “the sentiment of the sublime”, and “reveals at the highest level the pride of the free man” (Reflections). We can liken this creative, inherently Faustian aspect of violence to the new values of “philosopher with a hammer” of Sils-Maria.

Violence is a means to create, it is not an ends in itself. This creativity invests it with an unequaled value. It is in the service of socialism because it wants to transform the world and not only to understand it, according to the famous phrase of Marx. Sorel thought socialism was a new idea. It had this youthfulness that refuses programs and clear and distinct ideas. Enclosed within a discourse, it loses all vitality. It becomes old, identical to its adversaries. Socialism is an idea in deeds, it’s a spontaneous product. It is evident that socialism has little relation with the social-democratic parties currently existing in “Western democracies.” The only common denominator is the name “socialism.” As for the rest …

 

 

A Socialism Foreign to World of Sophists, Economists, and Calculators

 

 

We have mentioned the thesis of Sternhell according to which Sorel is a thinker of “moralist revolution.” Polin mentions that Sorel is a “pessimist by temperament.” Thus for him, progress transcribes a bourgeois notion above all. He is against Hegel and thinks that “human nature always seeks to escape into decadence.” Man is subjected to the eternal law of combat. He must avoid the obstacles that contrast nature and his own nature (spinelessness, cowardice, mediocrity, etc.) The great danger of entropy hangs over man. Sorel wrote: “It is likely that collectives are attracted towards a complicated magma whose basis is disorder.” Violence then reveals its creative energy that fights entropy.

Sorel is a philosopher of energy. Man, thought Sorel, satisfied himself with a feeling of struggle. In this viewpoint, effort is more than positive, sought as an end in itself. Violence gives man a salvific energy that restrains him from being mediocre (Polin compares the Sorelian energy expressed through violence to the Stoic thumos.) Man ultimately links himself with morality through the violence emerging from his creative individuality. Violence is the permanent form of morality. So morality is a struggle against impoverishing entropy. We can refer to Nietzsche again. The new moral table of the German philosopher is close to the values of struggle and overcoming that Sorel reclaims for the workers.

With Sorel, morality equals self sacrifice, abnegation, heroism, selflessness, effort. The worker is the Roman warrior, the conqueror of the 20th century; he must possess the moral qualities that ennoble him and assure his superiority against the bourgeoisie. Sorel speaks with sympathy of this race of men “who consider life as a struggle and not as pleasure.” His keywords are: personal energy, creative energy, effective energy. This type of man is the student of the Greek warrior. He refuses the world of intellectuals who weaken him. Like Burke, he is foreign to the world of sophists, economists, and calculators. And Sorel goes further when he wrote: “The sublime is dead in the bourgeoisie” and this sublime is the prerogative of violence in history. It’s the source of revolutionary morality. The syndicate reconnects with the world of morality, thus the world of the sublime and heroism. It’s a place, a school of collective moralization. The syndicate is autonomous and its morality is a total conception of the world.

But Sorel is an apostle of violence because he believes in the new figure of the worker. Sorel identifies work for us. He rejects the war/work dichotomy of Auguste Comte. Work is a creative act that doesn’t bow to the dirty calculations of the capitalists in essence. Work is selfless. Like violence. The general strike is also an act free from any quest for material profit. Likewise, Polin feels that the notion of work is struggle in its own right. Work is, according to Sorel’s intuition, a Promethean act. Work is not only the act of transforming things, it acts on itself and the entire collective. Violence ennobles the consciousness of work; in other terms, it gives form to the act of creation and transformation.

Work, which is not a simple “factor of production” as the thinkers and economists of the liberal school pretend, nor a source of profit for the worker and surplus value for the entrepreneurs as Marxists in the strict sense believe, is a sublimated form of creation. It is quite evident that Sorelian violence is a quality that is inherent to the world of producers; the reduction of violence to the domination of man by man is the opposite of Sorel’s proletarian violence. Sorel even adds that at the heart of labor itself, one finds violence as the inner motor. Thus the notions are linked: labor, violence, morality. And socialism is then the result of this “emerging virtue” (Reflections). Work is a struggle, where the producer is roused by an absolute violence from which the historic creative act follows.

 

 

Violence, Antidote to the Baseness of the Soul

 

 

For Sorel, it is evident that this emergence of the socialism of violence will be to detriment of this old bourgeois world. If violence is a positive notion because it is creative, we must expect fierce opposition. Sorel proposes to define the territory of the conflict and situate the enemy against it. Civilization is the number one enemy of the emerging socialism, an enemy that relies on two other instances of the old world: democracy and the state. The troops that defend these citadels are varied and often apparent enemies: the camp of the bourgeoisie (liberals, radicals, partisans of capitalism outright, the conservative right) and the pseudo-socialists (the members of reformist parties, the democratic “left”, progressives of all tendencies).

Behind these abstractions (democracy, civilization, the state), Sorel unflaggingly combats the very common values of the ideology of mediocrity. With Sorel there is the sense of cultural war, the sense of the combat of values. He doesn’t believe in the labels that bourgeois discourse likes to attribute to the actors in its game. Words in the political game are only appearances. Sorel sought to scour the roots of these discourses. To be “socialist” means nothing if one is not aware of a conception of the world that breaks with merchant society. Laziness, baseness, hypocrisy, incompetence, cowardice are the common traits of the official parties.

Sorelian violence is actually very conscious of the real and historical stakes of the struggle. The non-values, which subjugate the producers and hold their freedom hostage, are concentrated in the economic conception of man, that Maurrassians called “economism.” The principles of this economism are twofold: the belief in material progress, the reduction of man to materialist values. Man benefits from both material comfort and an intellectual “comfort.” Man is an enormous stomach, destined for social and political submission. Consumer society is then the greatest camp of intellectual normalization. One can think that Sorelian violence would be in a state of rupture with the Western world, and all that this world carries behind it. Likewise, he would have a hard time recognizing himself in certain progressive critiques of consumer society, whose foundation resides in an even greater requirement of comfort. The philosophy of happiness is anti-Sorelian and Marcuse would be considered as a typical case of bourgeois utopianism by Sorel. The man who proclaims the end of work, who refuses struggle, who contests social war, this man that our 1970s philosophers summon from all their wishes, is very distant from the producer with the warrior mentality of “Reflections on Violence.”

 

 

The Illusions of Progress

 

 

As for “progress,” Sorel felt the need to devote an entire work to it as it seemed to him that this concept was an emblem of the bourgeois mentality. This was “Illusions du progrès.” The supreme illusion of an earthly paradise found at the end of time made Sorel cringe. Sorelian pessimism is the conclusion of an observation: man doesn’t fundamentally change. Sorel approves acts of material progress but for him it meant an admiration for the “creativity” of which these acts are the manifestations. Likewise, he believed in the proletariat, not like Marx who believed in the “chosen class of history”, but because he noted that the bourgeoisie no longer had the energy to continue the eternal struggle.

For Sorel, history is a succession of manifested energies in limited groups. The captain of industry is a positive figure. He’s an idea of his era. Furthermore, mercantile values are values of degeneration. War against modern (implicitly mercantile) society is a common starting point of Sorel and Maurras. Hate for the bourgeois, wrote Polin, is a meeting point between Action Française and Sorel. It’s a class without will, without honor, without dignity. The democratic regime suits it because it conserves, not because it is the source of creation. Sorel spoke harshly of the bourgeoisie because he noted a “degradation of the sentiment of honor” among them.

Sorel vituperates this democracy, he wrote: “(democracy) is the charlatanism of ambitious and pleasure seeking leaders” (Reflections). It matters little if this democracy is conservative or popular, it conserves and promotes the same decadence. The democratic socialists are “merchant politicians, demagogues, charlatans, manufacturers of intellect.” Moreover, not content to keep the people under an oppressive regime (where the workers are to work 16 hours a day, 6 days a week?), democracy established the reign of money. It’s a tyranny, a plutocratic tyranny, directed by the men of money, who want to preserve their own interests. Sorel wrote: “It is likely that their interests are the only motivations for their actions.” As for the leadership of the Worker’s International, Sorel denounced them as apprentice dictators. Their objective was the establishment of a “demagogic dictatorship.”

Sorel did not want state socialism. He demonstrates anarchist tendencies in his critique of the state, hardly compatible with the state dictatorship of the proletariat desired by the Marxists. The state (even socialist) is an “artificial state,” the bearer of a “marvelous servitude.” In history, the democratic state ends with the September Massacres. And what C. Pollin calls, like Sorel, the “ideological cortege” of democracy (human rights, humanitarianism, charity, pacifism, etc) changes nothing about the oppressive character of this regime. Sorel is the author of a famous quote on democracy: “Democracy is the dictatorship of incapacity” (Reflections). The two words that strike us: dictatorship, incapacity.

The anti-democratic critique of Sorel should not be confused with the reactionary ideology of the authoritarian current nor with the conservative discourse of law and order. Furthermore, we see a rejection of two camps with Sorel: the camp of the bourgeoisie, where cowardice dominates, and the camp of social reformism directed by corruption. Sorel believes in the class struggle, that makes him incompatible with social-democratic or conservative labels. The violence that this class struggle manifests is also a factor of energy in action. Like Pareto, he believed that the class struggle gives birth to new elites from the corpses for the fallen classes. Social peace is the state of absolute social entropy for Sorel. Yet, Sorel can not be Marxist because he doesn’t adhere to Marx’s final vision of the world. Struggle is the normal activity of humanity. It has no meaning if not to circulate elites in history. In summation, by becoming infinite, violence is the bearer of a project of creation, the bearer of a moral conception of life, the source of the producers’ organization.

 

 

III. Conclusions

 

 

In his introduction to “Reflections”, Sorel wrote: “I am not a professor, nor a popularizer, nor an aspiring party leader; I am an autodidact who presents the notes that I have used for my own instruction to a few people.” Thus “Reflections” constitutes an ensemble of practical observations. Sorel repeats: he does not want to create an academic work. Instead, it’s a pedagogical work for the use of free syndicalists, who are ready to receive a revolutionary message.

Sorelian violence is the purely moral and creative dimension of Sorel’s socialism. The message of Sorel is that socialism is not a political program, nor a political party. Socialism is a moral revolution; in other terms, socialism is primarily a reversal of mentalities. One could speak of “spiritual revolution.” And violence informs this brutal change of mind. Socialism without violence is not socialism. Only the use of violence assures a positive revolution. Sorel doesn’t recognize a creative violence in the acts of the French Revolution. He rejects all that aims to destroy for the sake of destruction. Violence gives socialism the mark of its nobility. It constitutes an essential value for the progressive and independent organization of producers.

For us, it is certain that socialism is not a rigid discourse. We do not desire to recognize a socialist regime or ideology in social democracy. Socialism is not an ersatz bastard of Western liberalism. Western regimes that claim socialism today are, with perhaps the exception of Austria in matters of foreign policy, shamefully, or “happily” compromised by social liberalism (on this subject, read in Le Monde Diplomatique of February 1984, the article entitled “A French socialism with the colors of liberalism”). Sorel predicted this involution towards a mixed discourse, where socialism and liberalism are “a good match.”

Sorel’s socialism is not a compromise. It presents itself as a cultural revolution. His objective is not to manage capitalism through a new division of power (what difference is there between a left wing and a right wing technocracy?) but to offer the true values of the revolution. Violence is a guarantor of fidelity to revolutionary values. It doesn’t mean smashing the windows of the big stores or practicing terrorist violence. True violence consists of overturning taboos. We must denounce the intellectual blockages of the West. We must not hesitate to question the system. That is the true violence of Sorel: intellectual autonomy … So, Sorel, a radical alternative?

 

 

Source: https://voxnr.com/4408/georges-sorel-socialisme-violence

Carl Schmitt: The Nomos of the Earth or the Rootedness of Law – PHILITT #2

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In “The Nomos of the Earth” (1950), Carl Schmitt shows that order cannot exist without rootedness. Against positivist thought and the cosmopolitan ideal, he appeals to the earth, the elementary substrate of any society, in order to understand humanity’s relation to the world.

[Article initially published in the magazine PHILITT #2 devoted to the earth and rootedness.]

A great figure of the German Conservative Revolution, Carl Schmitt opposed the heirs of Auguste Comte’s positivism, and more specifically judicial positivism, whose most famous theorist was Hans Kelsen (also an opponent of Schmitt). In his “Theory of Pure Law,” he only studies and recognizes law enacted by man, that one calls positive law, obscuring the deep origin of these norms and rejecting the very idea of natural law which would be based on higher values. On the other hand, striving to find the source of law, Schmitt revives the concept of an inherent law of the land. If localization, defined geopolitical space, primarily figures in his study of power relations, his philosophy of law invites us to a very organic reading, with a ecological connotation. Then, without even mentioning any moral values, that positivists qualify as extrinsic to judicial matters in order to disregard them, “The Nomos of the Earth” puts the logic of these legalists to the test of peasant common sense: “First, the fertile earth contains within herself, within the womb of her fecundity, an inner measure, because human toil and trouble, human planting and cultivation of the fruitful earth is rewarded justly by her with growth and harvest. Every farmer knows the inner measure of this justice.” The earth is also delimited by the man who works it, just like mountain ranges and waterways. Finally, it is the foundation of all enclosures, the visible manifestations of social order, power, and property. So one understands that the earth is “triply linked to law.” A particular order exists, proper to and defined by a given territory, which imposes itself from the moment it is taken. If seas are free, order reigns on terra firma.

This vision of an a priori and de facto rootedness of order seems to void the relativist posture which consists of believing that states and nations plunge an order that they create from scratch into the soil they dominate through force, great fireworks, symbols, and inflammatory speeches. If rootedness decrees order, it gives itself the attributes of a natural force and the reassuring face of a founding myth that aims unite a people with its land in a quasi-mystical manner. Schmitt refutes those who still want to see in the notion of rootedness a pure romantic abstraction without basis in reality, a superfluous and trite tool of policy provision, indeed a “nationalist” myth of “inwardness and hate for the other,” according to the now common abject expression. In reality we will discover that it is entirely the opposite, as someone who doesn’t accept a particular soil is irrevocably linked to a particular order and would consider that the order to which he consents is valid everywhere – for example, someone who pretends to be a citizen of the world: he would potentially violate every land, every order, every law, with the exception of his own.

The authentic peace lover can only admit that from the very moment where a territory is seized, the order that it bears imposes itself, as much on the inside, on whose who have seized it, as on the outside, that is to say, on the foreigner who can only legitimately impose a different order. In other words, to consider that a concrete link between rootedness and a particular order, between a given law and the land it rules over, doesn’t exist is a negation of the sovereignties that express themselves in the diversity of orders. So rootedness no longer appears as a choice, a myth, or an a posteriori construction, but primarily as an unsurpassable necessity of politics: the necessity of submitting to the order that the earth bears and imposes on he who takes it, divides it, and works it. To refuse this postulate can only lead to the destruction of the elementary substrate of all society. By using the term of nomos to designate “the first measure of all subsequent measures, the first land appropriation as the first partition and classification of space, the primeval division and distribution,” the author formulates a deep critique of positivist thought in its entirety, which is uninterested in the “way of birth” and for which only “the law of phenomenon” counts. This semantic method shows that in legal matters as well, he who disregards history disregards the earth as much as he who disregards the earth disregards history: he is rootless.

The idealist and universalist political project inherited from the French Revolution then seems absurd, making a concrete ambition of what the author designates as “philosophical generalizations of the Hellenistic era creating a cosmopolis from the polis.” And Schmitt adds that “they were deprived of topos, that is to say localization, and thus couldn’t constitute a concrete order.” One naturally comes to think that any political project, expressed through law, that doesn’t anchor itself in solid land and the reality it imposes is suspect.

From Ungrounded Thought to the Destructive Disdain for the Earth

If the rootlessness of the positivists, when it is only a working hypothesis, an academic intellectual posture, is not an a priori danger, the judicial and political evolution that concerned Carl Schmitt at the end of the “Nomos of the Earth” illustrates the disaster to which this paradigm leads. The “jus publicum europaeum” that the French Revolution began to question before the First World War finished it, rested on the acceptance of the diversity of judicial and spatial orders and the recognition of the enemy as justus hostis, in other words as a legitimate enemy to make war upon. But the ungrounded thought of the League of Nations (now the United Nations), American imperialism sometimes masked under the traits of a benevolent universalism, linked with the considerable means of mass destruction, could have broken humanity’s instinctive and natural attachment to the earth by reintroducing the notion of justa causa, once theological (and subject to the judgment of the Pope), into military relations while subsidizing the cosmopolitan dream. It’s as if the man capable of destroying the land of another (especially if the latter cannot do the same) despised the land deeply. As if the man capable of destroying the planet only thirsts to dominate it entirely to preserve himself. The the ambition of a “new world order,” the expression that George H.W. Bush himself imprinted on us, is the most striking symbol of this political and intellectual rupture: there no longer seems to be a place for multiple and diverse political and judicial orders, linked to their own lands, whose relations would be ruled by norms simply aiming to limit war. There will henceforth be a single order, universal and cosmopolitan, that we can envision being born in the rubble of Old Europe, symbolically taking root in the ruins of Dresden Cathedral. An order that has no history since it took nothing, an order that has no land but that which it has destroyed.

Also, war will no longer be limited, but criminalized, and prohibited in principle by the United Nations. Because an order, even global, can only be peaceful. Having tasked themselves with accumulating the sufficient means to reduce the world to dust, humanity is confronted with the moral question of the usage of these weapons of mass destruction. One can only reasonably allow using them in so-called just wars against an enemy that must be destroyed, and not only contained. But air war and the very newsworthy “police bombing” operations are the image of absolute contempt for the earth. “Aerial bombardment has annihilation as its only meaning and purpose,” states the author. We see fighter planes as arrogant and proud vectors of this new world order that is imposed from above, dismissing the earth from their cockpits, only knowing the earth of the American parent company. By pretending to conduct a war without ever treading on enemy soil, the essential link between occupation, obedience, and protection is broken in the eyes of Schmitt. Without soldiers on the ground, and thus without concrete links with the earth, the way to pure and simple destruction from the air is opened. But the opinion remains: soldiers no longer die on the field of honor. Once again, the link with the earth appears as an unavoidable and necessary source of order, while the use of aerial space alone sows chaos. It seems that only the projection of men onto the earth, the mother and support of all order, is capable of giving satisfactory political results. But that doesn’t matter, because there is no longer war, because all the enemies we strike are no longer states equal to those who fight against them, but the incarnation of evil! But, as David Cumin, biographer and specialist on Carl Schmitt, likes to recall, the enemy for the latter is “the figure of our own question,” the war of annihilation examines the paradigm and the morality of great Western military powers. This new relation to the earth invites us to seriously consider the lesson of Carl Schmitt at the end of his preface: “The earth has been promised to the peacemakers. The idea of a new nomos of the earth belongs only to them,” for modern destructive war separates law from its source and its seat, which is the earth.

Source: https://philitt.fr/2016/06/20/carl-schmitt-le-nomos-de-la-terre-ou-lenracinement-du-droit/

For a National Communism – The Magazine “Die Tat” – Alexandre Marc Lipiansky – La revue d’Allemagne et des Pays de langue allemande, N°60, October 15th 1932

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In troubled, uncertain, and transitory periods such as the one Europe – Germany in particular – has experienced for the last fourteen years, it is very rare that political struggles express the deep movement of the era, whether they dream of legal or illegal forms. Most of the time, revolutionary as well as governmental parties, act and fight for ideas and passions already on their way to obsolescence and concern themselves with problems that belong more to the past than the future or even the present. It is not just popular passions that unleash themselves for or against prefabricated people or ideas, if I could say, as if cast in the mold of history. The forces of the future, in similar eras, are often very distant from the political arena and even from what we commonly perceive through “action.” Thus in the 18th century, the social, political, and economic forms of modern France elaborated themselves bit by bit far from Versailles and Paris, in the peaceable and “inoffensive” literary and scientific societies of the provinces, in the reading room of Voltaire and the “Hermitage” of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Much later, Communist Russia was prepared during interminable debate sessions in the cafes of Zurich, Paris, and London. This is because the real “action” – that which bears fruit, inscribes itself in reality, and doesn’t pulverize itself into vain and noisy agitation – is firstly “thinking” and “speaking.” It’s difficult to say that there is an “essential” difference between “thought” and “action,” not only a difference of “degree,” and that thought is naturally action in the measure where it’s the expression of a meeting between concrete reality and the mind. It’s analogous to what happens for electromagnetic rays, which are only perceptible to our eyes between the red and violent wavelengths, but beyond the violent and below the red, they are not any less real. Without desiring to make vain and artificial historical comparisons between the situation in France before 1789, and that of Russia in 1917 and Germany today, it seems to us that it would help make sense of the realities limited to the observation of men, things, and issues that occupy the spotlight beyond the Rhine for the moment.

We certainly do not pretend that the German theater of electoral events is without immediate importance. Yet we cannot prevent ourselves from thinking that the electoral success of Hitler has a totally episodic character and is only a manifestation – or more accurately, an external and temporary deviation – without decisive importance, of the deep spiritual crisis that has impacted Germany for the past 14 years. It’s not a “Third Reich” as Hitler’s lieutenants imagine, that will end this crisis, that would be trivial; its a new incarnation of Germanic destiny.

During these last years, the German crisis was so virulent, so intense, so chaotic that it was impossible – even for informed observers – to try to ascertain the ferments of the future from the decomposing elements, truly the dead was mixed with the living like in a tropical forest in a maelstrom of souls.

But, for some time, the German spiritual crisis has tended to polarize and – as long as one is aware of how things are in Germany – one can discern profound currents, essential tendencies that are emerging beyond the Rhine. Doubtlessly these tendencies still lack precision on many points; but the general orientation is clearly being drawn and it seems one can risk saying that the evolution of Germany in the future will be under the sign of National Communism, of which others have already shown certain aspects. Of course we do not mean that this term indicates a constituted and crystallized form of society, but an ensemble of tendencies whose subsequent orientation is still difficult to summarize.

We wish to attempt, in the following pages, to study the movement of the souls and minds of the German youth in one of its most conscious, objective, and intellectual manifestations: the activity of the group around the magazine Die Tat. This magazine, of a highly intellectual character, has achieved an important readership figure and now occupies a first rank position in the life and spiritual evolution of the German youth – which the so-called informed press continues to pass over in silence. As, on the other hand, the group that is constituted around this magazine generally keeps its distance from political struggles – piquantly paradoxical for a magazine entitled “action” – it seems particularly interesting to us to treat this group as the geometric locus, or as the fulcrum, of a study on the German spiritual revolution. In this fashion, it will be possible for us to indicate, along the way, what constitutes universal elements in this human revolution – like any profound spiritual movement – and what assumes a specifically Germanic form. In other terms, the magazine Die Tat seems detached enough from political contingencies and practice so that impartial study of the ideas expressed or sketched in it reveals the spiritual crisis of Germany is the only the particular expression suited to the Germanic temperament and tradition of a general movement of souls and minds that increasingly extends to all European youth, whose manifestations are more or less intense or veiled according the particular circumstances that reign in each country.

For the past few years, the Die Tat group has shown a great amount of intellectual activity, and has successively released a number of interesting theories and ideas, curious but often imprecise and sometimes contradictory.

This plethora of ideas and tendencies that characterizes the activity of the Die Tat group, is actually interesting in itself. It proves that the writers who compose it are in intimate contact with psychological reality, in constant transformation, fusing with the Germany of today if I could say; as arrested ideas and doctrines with diamond sharp edges are always made by men of the drawing room and “ivory tower” intellectuals, without contact with the ambiance of their time and their country, emerging without spiritual light and without deep influence on their contemporaries. So we will not analyze in detail the theories and the ideas that the magazine Die Tat has successively introduced to the public in the course of the last years here.

In regards to a group such as Die Tat, such a method, purely analytic and academic, which suits theses at the Sorbonne, remains ineffectual. We will also try, in the following pages, to extract, on one hand, the tendencies that increasingly “galvanize” the movement and give it a decisive orientation, and, on the other hand, the essential ideas around which the Die Tat group concentrates and on which all the members seem to agree, whatever their divergences on other points, from the seething chaos of the more or less vague or even contradictory theses of Die Tat, and the circles that gravitate around this magazine.

Like most doctrinal constructions worthy of the name, the doctrinal construction that the members of the Die Tat group work for is firstly based on the observation of a given situation and disorder as the point of departure: this given situation, this disorder would be the general weakness of the modern capitalist system. The people of Die Tat do not condemn the capitalist system by dogmatic judgment in the abstract or through sentimental reaction; they are in no way professional socialists, if one can say that. If they condemn capitalism, in their eyes, this condemnation is written in the facts. The manner of envisioning things gives their studies on capitalism a very particular accent of scientific and nearly even academic objectivity. Thus the tone of the studies devoted to this problem by the mysterious Fried [pseudonym of Ferdinand Friedrich Zimmermann, author of the “End of Capitalism”], one of the principal collaborators of Die Tat, is as distant from the verbal violence and dogmatism of the socialist critique as it is from the pretentious frivolity of “drawing room anti-capitalism” so fashionable recently. They are the first to render justice to the historical merits of the system, as well as to the personal qualities of the men who were its creators and pioneers. Fried, in particular, shows with an impressive technical precision that highlights, so to speak, the mechanism by which modern capitalism has engaged our society in a real economic impasse. The purely economic part of Fried’s work is too dense, too rigorous, too detailed to possibly summarize in the framework of one article – despite its exceptional interest. On the other hand, it is possible to give a schematic survey of the entirely original psychological and sociological analysis that Fried makes regarding the evolution of the capitalist system from its beginnings until the current global crisis, which, according to our author, marks its logical conclusions and its historical end.

Fried divides the evolution of capitalist economic regime into three phases. The first is that of exploration, discovery, and the strictly technical and economic struggle.

It’s the heroic period of capitalism, the period where audacity and the taste for risk was truly inseparable from the capitalist spirit and where the identification of the former with the latter – which certain authors of political economy textbooks still do through routine and intellectual sclerosis – appears to Fried as legitimate and precise. After the phase of creation and conquest, comes the phase of establishment, organization, and regular development of the regime.

The mercenaries, the economic adventurers of the first period, often without scruples but not without a certain grandeur, are succeeded by a more balanced, less “colorful” type of man, if I could say, more staid, more bourgeois, in short, the type of the great “captain of industry,” prudent enough to conserve and manage the inherited wealth and industry, and, at the same time, “dynamic,” wise, and skillful enough to adapt the capitalist machine to new technologies and constantly changing necessities.

For some time already, the capitalist system has entered into a very different period than the first two: the period of bastardization and decadence. This phase would essentially be characterized by the abandonment of the principles of struggle and risk that created the strength and grandeur of capitalism. The current masters of the regime are surrounded by fat, their blood is heavy, their muscles are loose, while it seems that their fatigued nerves escape the control of their will and they become similar to those pale, de-virilized, and nocturnal “aesthetes” that the captains of industry fifty years ago would have mocked so loudly in their pride of strong, healthy, and vigorous men. Stinnes, Kreuger, and Company are only apparent exceptions that confirm the rule. It seems, according to our author, that the current masters of capitalism have fallen prey to what one could call the “psychosis of security.” All their efforts actually attempt to transform the powerful machine that their fathers bequeathed them into a vast system of mutual assurances. Multiple phenomena highlight this deficiency of capitalism, this abandonment of the principles that formed its basis and reason to exist. We will only cite a few significant examples: on one hand, the increasingly frequent call for the state to bail out bankrupt banks and struggling shipping companies (we know that in Germany today, nearly all the shipping companies and a number of important banks are in the hands of the state), and, on the other hand, take responsibility for the millions of unemployed that capitalism, which had once wrenched the peasants from the earth, is powerless to employ today. Finally we cite, in a similar vein, the maladroit and shameful borrowings that capitalism has made from the revolutionary economic concept of the “plan” under the hitherto inoperable form of cartels, trusts, international conventions, thus renouncing its very essence and signing, with its own hands, its death sentence after having signed its resignation by making an appeal for state tutelage; because we know that regimes which want to distort the principles of the rising new revolutionary order for their own benefit inevitably die from this botched transfusion of blood, if I could express myself so. Thus the new blood they injected into their veins ferments in their debilitated organism, provoking the shock that ultimately kills them. Must we recall that in 1789 the “Feuillants”, Barnave, Lameth, Monnier, that is to say the left wing monarchists, the supreme hope of the monarchy, delivered the coup de grace by trying to renew it, by accommodating it to the taste of the day.

Moreover, as the folks at Die Tat say, the disorganization of the capitalist organism also manifests through other signs, which, in the collective scheme, fully recall the symptoms of a neurotic individual. We will not overemphasize, in the restricted framework of an article, this aspect of the question. We will limit ourselves to pointing out, for example, that capitalist Europe’s equipping of exotic countries has thus aroused their future competitors’ self initiative, closing the possibilities of future commercial expansion in advance on one hand, and on the other hand, that post-war super-rationalization pushed beyond all measure and all sense, has lead to the most extravagant manifestations of real collective madness. One must confess that it is difficult for the impartial observer not to see, as the folks at Die Tat do, in this double and successive error of modern capitalism a truly unpardonable aberration, a sort of unnatural logic, which singularly recalls the logic of the schizophrenic and demented, whose thought turns on itself, so to say, and encloses itself in a labyrinth built on the void and fed with emptiness, impossible to break with reasoning.

The analyses, of which we have tried to give a succinct schema in the preceding pages, lead to – if one knows how to broadly interpret the thought of this German group which is the object of this study and separate it from the complications and digressions inherent to the German spirit – a categorical conclusion that one can formulate as thus: the capitalist system has freed the economy from all external restraint. It has unbound the economy from any attachment to non-economic factors of life and mankind. In other terms, it has realized the “pure” economy, the “absolute” economy, if we can say, also implicitly proclaiming the primacy of the economy. But having reached this point of perfection , it devoured itself so to say or more exactly it exploded, it cracked like a gemstone under extreme temperatures; absolute purity confused itself with sterilization. Here we note that Mme Yvonne Serruys concluded a very well documented study on the American attempt at super-rationalization entitled “Farm Board,” with a condemnation of the capitalist regime very similar to the one made by the Die Tat group. The spiritual French movement grouped around Ordre Nouveau and the magazine Plans also expresses analogous ideas on many points. There is evidently a connection of a few young minds that the impartial observer should note.

It seems, in any case, and whatever one may think of this phenomenon, that we have been assisting the collapse of the economy’s primacy for some time, and the deep meaning and lesson of this terrible economic crisis that ravages the world resides in this collapse. Mr Fried made us perceive a new proof of this collapse very subtly, an a contrario proof in a way, in the very attitude of those who – in different scheme from that of modern capitalist society – also claim the primacy of the economic in their doctrine. If one actually analyzes the theory and the practice of the “seizure of power” and the “socialist state,” as realized, in part, in Russia, one can note that they implicitly recognize a certain primacy of the state over the economy. Starting from this very interesting and curious observation, but perhaps a bit too subtle, the Die Tat group thinks that it is the state which, under a new form, must realize the necessary revolution, put an end to economic disorder and reestablish the primacy of the spiritual, without which human enterprises, whatever their order and nature may be, go awry and fall into chaos. We remark, in passing, that we recognize the mark of the modern German spirit in this accent put on the state.

The Die Tat group, after having established the critical review of the capitalist system’s weakness and having imputed, in the final analysis, this weakness to the reversal of values which consists of replacing the primacy of the spiritual with the primacy of the economic, thus came to believe that it the state’s duty to realize the new order which society needs.

But, as we have already said, the folks at Die Tat do not believe that the state, in its present form, can fulfill the role they assign it. The new state, they write, will the expression, the organic emanation of the “people” (Volkstaat). This notion of the “people’s state,” we immediately note, is not without a certain Germanic obscurity. Yet, if we study things closely in the spirit of Die Tat’s leaders, we perceive that the Volkstaat is only the concrete outcome, the crowing institution, if we can express it so, of a revolution that mustn’t limit itself to a change of political, social, and economic regime, but must be “a revolution of the soul” before all, capable of giving rise to a new “incarnation” of man and a new starting point for civilization. To summarize these abstract notions a little, we say – though this example has, like all historical examples, only a limited value – that the revolution predicted by Die Tat would be on the order of the Reformation, which gave a “new visage” to a large part of humanity. It seems we can sat that, in the spirit of the German thinkers grouped around Die Tat, the Volkstaat will be the active expression of the revolutionary people, the latter being the collective manifestation of the “new man.”

These ideas have lead the folks at Die Tat – who, we recall, are not drawing room theorists but thinkers convinced that ideas only have value in the measure where they are the intellectual reflection of human necessities and realities – to ask where they can find the elements, the ferments of the “revolutionary people” of tomorrow in today’s society. For these German revolutionaries, as for many observers of social realities, every given social state provokes the formation of an ensemble of opposing forces in itself – through an intrinsic reaction that would be too much to analyze here. According to Hans Freyer – the member of the group who has particularly studied this problem – it is essentially important that this organic reaction is not sterilized and channeled into a laborious attempt at transforming the given elements, which can only lead to the reform of the existing state of things, that is to say to compromise. For Freyer, the true expression of this internal dynamism of today’s society can only be a “rupture,” in other words a revolution. This conception leads, through a series of observations and deductions that we don’t have the space to analyze here, Mr Freyer to believe that Karl Marx committed an error by identifying revolutionary ferment with what he called the “proletariat.” While recognizing in part the truth of his theories, indeed even “the prophecies” of Das Kapital’s author. Freyer addressed a veritable indictment against the proletariat. The latter, according to our author, has not shown itself to be worthy of its revolutionary mission. It prefers the improvement of society to struggle against it; it has abandoned revolutionary spirit for the slow acquisition of well being within the very society that this spirit must destroy. Reformist socialism has betrayed its revolutionary mission. Mr Freyer tells us it only embodied a moment of history, the protest of an elite that believed it expressed, and expressed often, the effort of the proletariat directed against the concept of bourgeois society made man into a thing, a commodity. But setting foot on the ground of actual reality, the proletariat renounced this leap into the world of freedom of which Marx spoke and concluded an armistice, maybe even a peace treaty, with the spirit of bourgeois society. More than any other opposition party, the ideology of socialism agreed to every conciliation in advance. It still uses – through a mixture of routine and hypocrisy – the term of struggle, devalued and devoid of any substance, but it no longer attaches any concrete or dynamic meaning to it. So it will not be the proletariat who will form and erect the foundation of this new state that Fried announces, and Freyer proclaims the necessity and imminence of a “revolution from the right.”

What does Die Tat mean by this term, “revolution from the right,” which lends some ambiguity? Nothing resembling the reactionary movement. Quite on the contrary, for them, revolution from the right is that which is capable of resolving the problem that escaped the so-called “revolution from the left,” that of the proletariat: namely the liquidation of the “atomistic” and “rationalist” society of the past two centuries. That is to say that the “revolution from the right” of Die Tat’s men is in some way, and in certain aspects, beyond Marxism, beyond communism. Through it, the doctrine of Freyer and his friends singularly incidentally resembles the doctrine of the small grouping of “Eurasianists” who seek to complete and “transcend” Soviet communism. Now that we have seen the goals and orientation that the German group we’re studying intends to give to the “revolution from the right,” two questions naturally come to mind: who will realize the revolution and in what manner?

It is perhaps one of the points where Freyer’s thought and the doctrine of Die Tat have the most novelty and creative originality. In their eyes, the revolution is not actually a simple question of temporal interests, it will not be the work of a “class.” It can only be realized by those who have already performed it in themselves and for themselves, who have broken with the bourgeois conception of life, and whose vision, mind, and soul are open to the “revelation” of the necessary world of tomorrow, who already live in it, so to say. Those who carry in themselves this “revelation”, this vision if one prefers, form – according to the thinkers of Die Tat – the initial cell of the “revolutionary people.” And thus is clarified this notion of the “revolutionary people,” of which it seems that one can say it is – in the doctrine we’re trying to analyze – both the revolutionary ferment within present society and the prefiguration of the future society that will form when the revolutionary rupture eliminates the “categorical imperatives” of pure “rationalism” and “utilitarianism” that poison the world today. In summation, according to Die Tat, the revolutionary people is, in the measure that it already exists, and will be, in the measure where it will encompass all of society one day, lead by ideals, through ideas, in the sense that the Greeks gave to the word, instead of material preoccupations erected as sacred dogmas and indisputable axioms under a more or less direct form. The society of tomorrow will be “ideocratic.” That doesn’t mean, however, that the Die Tat group neglects the economic aspects of life. It only intends to put economics in its proper place, which is secondary and necessary, and subject it to the spiritual. We have already addressed the ideas of Mr Freyer and his friends on reformist socialism above. The readers won’t be astonished that the Die Tat group affirms that the attitude of the “people” before today’s society can only be – contrary to the attitude of most union workers – one of absolute intransigence. Revolution, according to them, can only arise from what Mr Freyer calls radical negation: an energetic, even frightening term. The question that asks itself, on this point of analysis, can be formulated as thus: according to the Die Tat group, what must the point of this “radical negation” be firstly directed against? In other terms, what is the place in the edifice of bourgeois society that should be attacked first?

The answer to this question is found in various studies by the Die Tat group, but it’s Mr Hans Zehrer, former editor of the liberal Vossische Zeitung, currently the leader of the movement that is the object of this study, who has answered it at length and most precisely. For him, it’s liberalism, the liberal conception of truth in particular, and parliamentarianism as its projection into the political field, that the “revolution” must attack before all. According to Hans Zehrer, the liberal conception of the truth – common to all political parties, whether on the right or left – can thus be analyzed: the truth is, before all, what is discussed; more exactly truth only exists as a function of the scientific confrontation of opinions and decision only emerges via abstract reasoning. And, in the final analysis, decision is made from a compromise pushed as far as possible and a sort of numeric operation of which the “vote” is the most complete and adequate expression. It’s exactly because the regime is bound to this more or less conscious conception of truth, that all action engaged against it, on its on terrain, that is to say – to transpose what we just said in the philosophical scheme to the political one – in the parliamentary field, far from harming it, necessarily enforces it.

To support these affirmations, Zehrer, reviewing the forces of resistance which, in the course of the 19th century tried to either curb the evolution of capitalist society or block it, shows that these forces, conservative as well as socialist, have been subjected to the same processes of degradation and decomposition under the dissolving action of the parliamentary pseudo-struggle against capitalist liberalism. Henceforth, far from threatening the foundations of contemporary society, social conservatism (the Die Tat group sees, not incorrectly, in social conservatism, a tradition that runs counter to the primacy of the economic that Fried attributes to the appearance of capitalism, as we have already seen), on one hand, and reformist socialism on the other, form essential pieces of it. The latter, by limiting capitalist arbitrariness through an adroitly arranged philanthropy on very level of the regime, prevents capitalist society from provoking, through its excess, an overly violent reaction. It acts as a sort of lubricant according to Zehrer, indeed even an intermediary mechanism destined to dampen the inevitable shocks of the machine. As for conservatism, it masks the spiritual nothingness of contemporary capitalism by shoring it up with values imbued with patriotism, tradition, religion, thus throwing a veil of pseudo-spirituality on the naked inhumanity of the system.

We see there is something “religious” in the Die Tat group’s conception of the revolution; thus begging the question of what is the group’s attitude towards religion, and in particular the religion organically constituted in the framework of the Catholic Church; Hans Zehrer doesn’t take a strong position in this regard; but if one knows how to make the necessary connections and overlaps in his book, it is easy to take account of his tendencies on this point; Zehrer condemns with utmost severity the German Catholic Center Party because it uses the religion to sustain dying liberalism; but Zehrer thinks, on the other hand, that if the Catholic Church could break with what is destined to perish in today’s world, new and magnificent “chances “would open to it.

Having reached this point of his analysis, Mr Hans Zehrer has come to envision the most immediate reality and consider the political and psychological facts of the present situation in Germany. He doesn’t believe in the strength of resistance of what one could call the moderate parties. From socialism to national conservatism, these parties will increasingly see their influence diminish in the measure that the German revolution takes form and gains consciousness, and they are destined to disappear in the revolutionary tumult that will follow. Thus only the extremes should retain our attention: the national-socialist wing on one hand, the communist wing on the other.

One cannot deny that there are open or secret links between the movement of Die Tat, which sometimes shows some affection for fascism, and national-socialism. There is, on certain points, an indisputable parentage between the ideas that the publicists and economists grouped around Die Tat slowly elaborate and those trumpeted by the adepts of the Third Reich. It is certain, in particular, that a theory such as that of economic autarky – a theory that we find elsewhere in the liberal economy of the 19th century – has acquired a new prestige, thanks to the highly interesting works of Die Tat. We cannot analyze or even summarize these economic studies here. We will content ourselves with noting that the partisans of economic autarky start from the observation of international capitalism’s weakness to reach, relying on a politico-geographic analysis of what they call the Germano-Balkan or Germano-Slavic “space,” the conclusion of the possibility of a nearly complete rupture of relations between Germany and the capitalist West.

We will remark in passing that if German big industry has supported Adolf Hitler, the prophet of autarky, for purely tactical reasons, it now seems to be increasingly abandoning this peculiar theory where the most audacious observations mingle with reminiscences of a bygone era – in order to seek a rapprochement with French heavy industry.

For some time already, the attitude of the Die Tat group regarding national-socialism has become extremely reserved, even negative. In effect, national-socialism only has an existence as a mass movement, while, on the contrary, the Die Tat group resolutely condemns large organizations with an electoral character. On the other hand, national-socialism is engaged in the most demagogic activity, while the Die Tat group is reserved and concentrated on itself. “He who lacks the courage to abstain from all immediate action is a spiritual deserter,” proclaims Mr Fried. That is to say that the collaborators of Die Tat can only rebuke the noisy exhibitions of Adolf Hitler. The only ambition of the Die Tat group now is to address a merciless critique of what it calls capitalist and liberal bankruptcy.

But one can guess that the communist party is not any more sympathetic to the friends of Zehrer than the national-socialist party today. For Zehrer, the two militant wings of the revolution both have betrayed their mission. They have transformed themselves into “parties,” in the liberal and bourgeois sense of the word, into mass organizations based on quantity, and consequently subject to the laws of demagogy, delivered to the “temptation of legality” and parliamentarianism. Thus they lost on the way the creative intransigence without which the necessary revolution is stillborn. Imperceptibly, the “liberal virus” thus infected the most decided adversaries of liberal society.

Before this “deficiency of revolutionary parties” thus stigmatized by Mr Zehrer, what are the recommendations of the Die Tat group? In other terms, what are the formations and groupings, present or future, in which the revolutionary spirit could be embodied, the only thing capable of saving Germany – and later the world – from perdition, in the eyes of Mr Zehrer and his friends.

It seems that the predictions and sympathies of Mr Zehrer lend themselves to an eventual transformation of the communist party which – one one hand, detaching itself from its specifically Marxist origins with which its links are already fairly relaxed, and on the other hand, linking to Stalinist myth (so long as it has real value) of the historical-geographic development of Eurasia – could integrate the German national tradition. It seems that national-communism summarizes the thought of the director of Die Tat on this point.

But the politico-social aspect of the question is far being expressed in an entirely adequate fashion in the thought of Mr Hans Zehrer. More precisely, he doesn’t exhaust the problem, such as it is posed by the thinkers of Die Tat. Any revolution worthy of calling itself one is thus not only a radical change of institutions and their principles, but especially and above all a real creation, that of a “new man.”

This new man can only arise from a spiritual effort, in all its depth and concentrated intensity. Within today’s chaos, we must not join “political parties”, but unite in “groups of thought and action,” – in “lodges” – if the term doesn’t not evoke something radically different in the eyes of French readers than what is meant by Die Tat – in organically linked societies of men who prepare the future. These men must have a new conception of life and the world; such a conception cannot be elaborated by solitary thinkers working in their ivory towers, by “clerks”, in other words, but by “concrete revolutionaries” linked to the very substance of their people and representing, or more exactly, projecting the convulsions and growth of the people in the spiritual scheme.

We hope we have given the French reader, in this article, an exact enough synopsis of the essential ideas, very interesting but sometimes confused or a bit contradictory, emerging from the ensemble of works inspired by the bold initiatives of the magazine Die Tat. Doubtlessly, we have been obligated to give an unintentional stylization to a movement in the midst of evolution. But unless one succumbs to the temptation of chaos and formlessness that any impartial observer of present day Germany cannot fail to experience, we must resign ourselves to limiting ourselves and framing a movement nearly impossible to tie down in all its liquid complexity, if I can express myself so. Anyhow, our intention is to show, above all, behind the facade of garish colors of today’s political edifice, the slow movement of forces that will shape tomorrow.

The Youth Movement and National Revolutionary Ideology Under the Weimar Republic – Thierry Mudry –  Vouloir n°43/44 – 1987

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From the years 1924-25 until the legislative elections which, in short, would propel the National Socialist party into the first rank, nationalist militancy was principally represented in Germany by the paramilitary groups (Wehrverbände), the heirs of the Freikorps, and the youth leagues (Bünde). Due to the economic crisis, the most radical elements of these groups and leagues would evolve towards revolutionary national socialism (the Strasser tendency) or National Bolshevism while others (that is to say the majority of the league members and leaders) would seek an accommodation with the system for a time and rally to new parties, like the German State Party (arising from the merger of the Democratic Party and the Young German Order of Artur Mahraun) and the Conservative People’s Party (formed by the Social Christians and elements coming from the extreme right DNVP), trying in vain, to make them instruments of German revival.

 

 

Bündisch Socialism

 

 

The members of the youth leagues were inflamed with passion for “Bündisch socialism,” a variant of the “German socialism” to which numerous socio-professional milieus and political groups in Weimar Germany rallied. “Bündisch socialism” was very close to the “soldierly socialism” professed by their elders in the paramilitary groups. In both cases, the accent of this socialism was put on the group, not only on the Bund or the militarized group, but also the Volksgemeinschaft (the Community of the People) served by Bund or group, into which it was integrated. While the “soldierly socialism” of the elders was based on the experience of the war and the comradeship of the front, the “Bündisch socialism” of the youth rested on the experiences of hikes throughout Germany, the contact with the German people, and the communitarian experience of the Bund, the comradeship experienced within the Bund. With the crisis and the increasing radicalization of the youth leagues, “Bündisch socialism” became more concrete and transformed into a national-revolutionary socialism favorable to the total or partial nationalization of the means of production, a planned economy, and German or Central European autarky.

 

 

The Hitlerian Challenge

 

 

After Hitler’s accession to power, the principal youth leagues (except the “Mendicants”, the most moderate, notably the important Deutsche Freischar) united in March 1933 into the Grossdeutsche Jugendbund under the sponsorship of Admiral von Trotha, a close associate of Reich President Hindenburg. Thus they hoped to escape the “synchronization” (Gleichschaltung), meaning dissolution and the integration of their members into the Hitler Youth. On their side, the “hardest” leagues, the most Völkisch (for which Volk was often synonymous with Rasse) and the most critical regarding Hitlerism at the same time (they judged it from a revolutionary national socialist or National Bolshevik point of view) regrouped into a Bündische Front für Wehr-, Arbeits- und Grenzdienst ( Bündische Front for the service of defense, labor, and border security), under the presidency of a “Trotskyite of National Socialism,” Dr Kleo Pleyer.

The youth leagues were, despite their desperate efforts, dissolved during the summer of 1933. Their members then entered into the Hitler Youth and especially in the cadre of the Deutsche Jungvolk (which gathered the youngest elements of the Hitler Youth) in order to continue their activities and promote the Bündisch spirit there. The others, older, (the associates of Friedrich Hielscher) entered into the SS and the Ahnenerbe (“Heritage of the Ancestors”, the sector of the SS specializing in scientific research, particularly historical and prehistoric research). Yet others (the Strasserists under the direction of Heinz Gruber) chose to enter into the Labor Front in order to accentuate its socialist orientation. Finally, Dr. Werner Haverbeck tried to regroup the youth of Bündisch spirit into an organization, Reichsbund Volkstum und Heimat, a satellite association KdF (Kraft durch Freude, “Strength Through Joy”) – this organization would soon count nearly a million members.

 

 

The Repression Begins

 

 

But under the notable pressure of Baldur von Schirach, leader of the Hitler Youth, who feared seeing his authority over the German youth contested, repression struck the former Bündisch leader from 1934 onward: some were excluded from the Hitler Jugend [Werner Lass, founder and leader of the “Freischar Schill” and the secret organization of the Eidgenoßen (Confederates)], others were arrested [Heinz Gruber, founder and leader of the Schwarze Jungmannschaft, the social-revolutionary dissidence from the Hitler Youth, which became part of Otto Strasser’s Black Front; Robert Oelbermann, founder and leader of the Nerother Wandervogel] or forced into exile [Eberhard Köbel, nicknamed “tusk”, founder and leader of the “Deutsche Jungenschaft vom 1.11.1929”, dissident movement from the important Deutsche Freischar; Fritz Borinski, social democrat and one of the leaders of the Deutsche Freischar; Hans Ebeling, founder and leader of the Jungnationaler Bund, deutsche Jungenschaft; Karl-Otto Paetel, founder and leader of the Gruppe Sozialrevolutionärer Nationalisten], others were ultimately assassinated [Karl Lämmermann, one of the leaders of the Deutsche Freischar, assassinated during the Night of the Long Knives]. Haverback’s Reichsbund was dissolved.

Despite four successive bans (in 1933, 1934, February 6th 1936, and May 13th 1937) and the mandatory incorporation of the German youth into the Hitler Youth, mandated in 1936, and applied in practice in 1939, certain leagues would continue their activities in Germany clandestinely and illegally. That was the case of:

1) The “Deutsche Jungenschaft vom 1.11.1929”, founded by “tusk”, the alias of Eberhard Köbel, in 1931, in liaison with the exiled Karl-Otto Paetel and Otto Strasser (Helmut Hirsch, member of the “d.j. 1.11” and correspondent of Strasser, condemned to death on June 4th 1937, would be hanged at Plötzensee).

2) The Nerother Wandervogel

3) The Jungnationaler-Bund, deutsche Jungenschaft, dismantled in 1937, whose leaders would be heavily condemned during the trial in Essen.

If certain leagues could survive clandestinely, with limited effective membership, new groups appeared, bands of adolescents who refused integration into the Hitler Youth and the militarization of the youth. Some of these bands imitated Western fashions and prefigured the postwar groups, others professed a moralizing Christianity and constituted the continuation of the Christian youth organizations, yet others renewed the romantic ideal of the Wandervögel. Among these new groups, the most well known was, without contest, Die Weisse Rose, in which some of the oldest belonged to youth leagues.

The Bündisch youth, and their imitators, were not the only ones to resist Hitlerian “Fascism”: we must also mention the young communists in the labor milieu and the young Catholics in the Rhineland and Bavaria. While the first relied on the clandestine infrastructure of the German Communist Party, the second sheltered themselves behind the Concordat signed between Hitler and the Pope in 1933.

 

 

The Bündisch Ideal in Exile

 

 

The Bündisch ideal, progressively smothered in Germany, was maintained abroad in exile. Otto Strasser sparked the creation of a Ring bündischer Jugend, which was integrated into his Deutsche Front gegen das Hitlersystem (German Front against the Hitlerian System). An anti-fascist magazine, controlled by the communists, emerged in Paris under the title Freie deutsche Jugend (this phrase denoted a faction of the independent youth movement between 1913 and 1923 and would denote the East German youth organization after the Second World War). Karl-Otto Paetel edited in Stockholm, then in Brussels and finally in Paris, the Schriften der jungen Nation and the Blätter des sozialistischen Nation (disseminated in Germany by the Siliava sisters, members of the “Deutsche Jungenschaft vom 1.11.1929” in Berlin). Finally in 1935, Hans Ebeling and Theo Hespers would establish the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Bündischer Jugend in Belgium, which Paetel and Tusk joined, which would give rise to the Deutsche Jugendfront. This youth front was linked to Dutch, Belgian, and British groups. It was born from the desire to regroup the entire German youth opposition. But this attempt failed due to communist maneuvers and these young resistants’ lack of cohesion. Ebeling and Hespers, who were not discouraged, then published the magazine Kameradschaft (Comradeship) from 1937 to 1940.

 

 

Hans Ebeling and Theo Hespers

 

 

Ebeling and Hespers’ magazine Kameradschaft dreamed of uniting all the youth animated by the Bündisch ideal beyond the conventional political divides. Their will to struggle against the uniformity of organization introduced by the NSDAP preceded from a desire to exclude no Volksgenosse [member of the folk] from the future community being constructed. In light of the passions that animated the political scene of the era, this project and this hope was utopian, which the communists perfectly perceived. A heavy suspicion of treason would weigh on their leaders, in contact with people who actually plotted against Germany for the benefit of foreign services. The poor Hespers would pay dearly for his idealistic commitment: he would be hanged at Berlin-Plötzensee.

The magazine Kameradschaft constitutes an important testimony to the resistance of the Bündisch youth to the Hitlerian state and to its social and political project against Fascism. This German language magazine, edited in Belgium, was clandestinely disseminated in Germany. Its founders, Hans Ebeling and Theo Hespers, were both former youth league leaders in exile. The first, born in 1897 in Krefeld, had taken part in the First World War (he finished it with the rank of lieutenant), the combat of 1920 (in the Rhineland) in the ranks of the provisional Reichswehr and the resistance against the French occupation troops in the Ruhr. He joined the Jungnationaler Bund shortly after, from which he separated in 1924 to found the more activist and more radical Jungnationaler Bund, deutsche Jungenschaft, which evolved towards National Bolshevism. Starting from the end of 1929 until January 1933, Ebeling directed, with Professor Lenz, the magazine Der Vorkämpfer.

In the company of other Bündisch leaders (notably Werners Lass and Karl-Otto Paetel) Hans Ebeling participated in international meetings in Freusburg (August 1927) and in Ommen in Holland (August 1928), destined to prepare the foundation for a global league for peace. These international meetings, during which the young Bündisch leaders established contacts with the representatives of the extreme left and the colonized peoples, accelerated the radicalization of the youth leagues (note that Ebeling, Lass, and Paetel, who participated in them, consequently became figures of National Bolshevism) and would inspire Ebeling to found, with Prof. Lenz, a few months later, in January 1930, the magazine Vorkämpfer, with a ultra-nationalist, anti-capitalist (Vorkämpfer adopted elements of Marxist analysis) and anti-imperialist (and pro-Soviet) orientation.

Theo Hespers, born in 1903, joined the Catholic youth organization Quickborn at the age of 14, to which he belonged until 1927. He also participated in the passive resistance against the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr. He then joined the Vitus-Heller-Bewegung and directed the Pfadfinderschaft Westmark, which constituted, with Ebeling’s league, Werner Lass’ Freischar Schill, and the Young Prussian League of Jupp Hoven, the “Combat Committee of the National Revolutionary Groups in the Western March” in the Rhineland.

The Vitus Heller movement to which Theo Hespers belonged was the only Christian National Bolshevik movement (the other movements of this type affected indifference to religious matters, even an aggressive atheism, or spoke in favor of a Germanic neopaganism) and actually implanted itself in the Catholic milieu (National Bolshevism was, as L. Dupeux demonstrated, a very majority “Protestant” phenomenon – unsurprising since National Bolshevism attached itself to the German protestant tradition of Arminius, Widukind, and Luther – which did not prevent the Catholic Rhineland, a frontier region receptive to German nationalist theses, from being, with Berlin and Franconia, one of the strongholds of National-Bolshevism).

 

 

The Bund, Alternative to the Parties and the Single Party

 

 

Kameradschaft wanted to be the tribune of the young opponents of Hitlerism. The Young Nationalists, Young Socialists, Young Catholics, and Young Protestants who expressed themselves in Kameradschaft affirmed themselves as Bündisch, völkisch and great German nationalists, Christians, Democrats, and Socialists at the same time.

For them, the Bund constituted a political mode, the model of a “German democracy,” founded on the Führer / Gefolgschaft pair (the charismatic Führer, in the service of the idea, freely chosen and subjected to the permanent approbation of the group, was only a first among equals here). They contrasted the Bund to the bankrupt parties of the Weimar democracy and the single party of the Hitlerian dictatorship. The Bund was also a social model founded upon comradeship (Kameradschaft) – contrasted to Hitlerian Schadenfreude – and a model of individual integration and socialization based on enthusiasm; a model of political education and even a model of the revolutionary community of combat formed by the activist German youth, enemy of Weimar and then Hitlerism.

For the collaborators of Kameradschaft, who particularly insisted on the role played by the Bund in the matter of political education and for whom the Bündisch man was the political man par excellence, entirely devoted to the service of the state and the people, the Hitlerian state appeared as a dictatorship of apolitical petty bourgeois elements (associated with a politicized Reichswehr but avoiding all political responsibility). Under the Third Reich, the political, indeed physical liquidation, of nationalist activism considered dangerous by the new masters of Germany (paramilitary groups and youth leagues) seems revelatory in this regard. Kameradschaft devoted two large articles to the judicial proceedings against the Jungnationaler Bund, deutsche Jungenschaft, and against Niekisch and the “ Eberhard comradeships.”

 

 

Redefining Volksgemeinschaft

 

 

The völkisch nationalists took up the defense of the Volk and the Volkstum but refused the “neo-German imperialism” of the Hitlerians. In the spirit of the collaborators of Kameradschaft, völkisch nationalism attached itself to the defense of the independence and Volkstum of all peoples. They also took up the defense of the Volksgenossen, against the continuing capitalist exploitation and against the arbitrariness of the Hitlerian state; they advocated the constitution of a true Volksgemeinschaft (community of the people) unrelated to the so-called Volksgemeinschaft, product of the police state and Hitlerian mass politics; in their eyes the constitution of this “true” Volksgemeinschaft constituted a new socio-economic order (socialists), which would put an end to the class order arising from capitalism, and a spiritual reorientation (völkisch) with a Christian essence, which would combat the materialist disarray of the epoch. The “revolutionary national socialists” of Otto Strasser and the “social-revolutionary nationalists” of K.O. Paetel defended the same point of view (with the nuance that the spiritual reorientation envisioned by Paetel and his friends would be most German pagan than Christian).

Like Otto Strasser, they contrasted the greater German tradition, based on the refusal of the Austro-Prussian dualism, in which they situated themselves, to Pan-Germanism. They rejected the capitalist economy founded on profit as well as the war economy and “bureaucratic anarchy” (of Hitlerian Germany realized the symbiosis), to which they substituted a Plan (a German, then European Plan). They prefigured, in the framework of this plan, an economy destined to satisfy the needs of the people, the nationalization of key industries which would break the power of big capital, and the sharing of large landed properties, and finally the constitution of cooperatives in all domains of economic activity.

 

 

In fact, the editorship of Kameradschaft posed as the heir of two traditions:

 

 

1) The Libertarian Tradition of the Wandervogel

 

 

The tradition of the independent youth movement, notably the Free German Youth emerging during the meeting at Hohe Meißner in 1913. Against the paternal / paternalist world (Väterwelt), the youth movement affirmed its fidelity to the forefathers, the ancestors (Vorväter). Against the tutelage of institutions (school, church, family) and bourgeois society, they claimed independence and chose young leaders for themselves. Against the Wilhelmine state and bourgeois chauvinism, they affirmed their love for the Volk and their allegiance to the Volk. Against the big city, the movement proposed the Wandern, hiking across the German countryside (“the deep Germany”) in contact with the authentic German Volk. Against revealed religion, they encouraged Germanic religiosity. Against the use of tobacco and condemning alcoholism, against physical degeneration, they exalted physical strength and Nordic beauty (depicted by the artist Fidus), and practiced gymnastics and nudism.

Finally, after the test of the Great War, the youth movement lead to the emergence of youth leagues in 1924-25 arising from the merger of the dissident scout groups and the Wandervögel.

 

 

2) The “Freikorps” Tradition

 

 

The tradition of the Freikorps, which had formed the provisional Reichswehr in 1919 before becoming enemies of the Reichswehr issuing from the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles (which had reestablished the aristocratic traditions of the Imperial Army, thus putting an end to the democratization of the army, and notably the officers corps, provoked by the Great War and its consequences), and the tradition of the national-revolutionary paramilitary groups that succeeded the Freikorps, who attacked the reaction embodied by the industrialists and planters, the generals of the Reichswehr and the right wing politicians.

Despite the originality of the Hitlerian phenomenon and the originality of the magazine’s interpretation of it (an interpretation which approached the ‘theory of totalitarianism’ in certain regards), Kameradschaft reprised certain critiques against Hitlerism that had been formulated beforehand by its predecessors in the youth movement regarding Wilhelminism, and by its predecessors in the Freikorps or paramilitary groups regarding Weimar and reaction (notably the Reichswehr associated with Hitlerian power) in the Weimar era.

 

 

Links between the Bündische in exile with the French “Non-Conformists” and “Planistes”

 

 

Beyond the bond of evident shared lineage between the German Youth, the Freikorps and paramilitary groups, and Kameradschaft, one notes an astonishing relation between the ideas of the Bündisch youth, as expressed in Kameradschaft, and those of the young French Non-Conformists of the 1930s who adhered to patriotic, federalist, personalist, communitarian, planist, corporatist or syndicalist watchwords.

Contacts existed between the representatives of the German youth leagues and the French Non-Conformist groups: thus Harro Schulze-Boysen (veteran militant of the Young German Order, who would later play a first rank role in the Red Orchestra, and director of Planer, the German equivalent of the French magazine Plans, directed by Philippe Lamour), was, with Otto Abetz, one of the German delegates to the Front unique de la Jeunesse Européenne, created on the initiative of the French groups Plans and Ordre Nouveau. Consequently, Ordre Nouveau entertained close contacts with Otto Strasser, the group formed around the magazine Die Tat, and especially the magazine Der Gegner (The Adversary) – to which Louis Dupeux devoted a chapter of his thesis on National-Bolshevism – directed by Harro Schulze-Boysen and Fred Schmid, founder and leader of the Grey Corps league, a split from Deutsche Freischar.

But personal contacts alone cannot explain such a convergence: what linked the best elements of the German and French youth was a common refusal of liberalism and totalitarianism, from which they emerged, and a common aspiration to a spiritual (or if one prefers: cultural), political, and socioeconomic revolution.